Sardar Patel (I) : Interesting Extracts, Part-I
Sardar Patel (II) : Interesting Extracts, Part-II
Sardar Patel (III) : Interesting Extracts, Part-III
On the occasion of
Rashtriya Ekta Diwas (National Unity Day)
31 October 2014
the Birth Anniversary of Sardar Patel
Sardar
Patel :
Interesting Extracts
Part-I
Part-I
Here are some select interesting extracts on Sardar Patel put
together
from the various chapters of the book,
“Foundations of Misery : Blunders of the Nehruvian Era”
by Rajnikant
Puranik
(www.rkpbooks.com).
What They Said
If only Sardar had been the PM...
“While I usually came back from meeting Gandhiji elated and
inspired but always a bit sceptical, and from talks with Jawaharlal fired with
emotional zeal but often confused and unconvinced, meetings with Vallabhbhai
were a joy from which I returned with renewed confidence in the future of our
country. I have often thought that if fate had decreed that he, instead of
Jawaharlal, would be younger of the two, India would have followed a very
different path and would be in better economic shape than it is today.”
– JRD Tata
~ ~ ~
“Gandhi’s death reunited Nehru and Patel. Their
reconciliation not only saved Congress and India’s central government from
collapse, but it kept Nehru in power. Without the Sardar’s strength and support
Nehru might have broken down or been forced out of high office. Vallabhbhai ran
India’s
administration for the next two years [before his death] while Nehru indulged
mostly in foreign affairs and high Himalayan adventures.”
“The Sardar, as Congress’s strongman was called, was
determined to stay and solve whatever problems remained, rather than running
away from them. He had long viewed Nehru as a
weak sister and often wondered why Gandhi thought so highly of him.”
– Stanley Wolpert, Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny
~ ~ ~
“The Sardar [Patel] always reminded me of the pictures of
Roman emperors in history books. There was something rock-like in his
appearance and demeanour...The Sardar’s reading of the pulse of India was
almost uncanny in its accuracy.”
– Roy Bucher, the
Army Chief
~ ~ ~
“Returning from London on the night of May 30, Mountbatten,
in his own words, ‘sent V.P.Menon to see Patel to obtain his agreement to six
months joint control [with Pakistan] of Calcutta’, which is what Jinnah had
been pressing for. The Viceroy recorded
Patel’s reply: ‘Not even for six hours!’
Earlier...Jinnah had demanded an 800-mile ‘corridor’ to link West and East Pakistan. Patel called the claim ‘such fantastic nonsense as not to be taken
seriously’. It died a quick and unremembered death.”
– Rajmohan Gandhi, Patel–A Life
(Unlike Nehru, Sardar
Patel was very firm in his dealings.)
~ ~ ~
“[Humayun] Kabir [translator and editor of Maulana Azad's
autobiography] believed that Azad had come to realize after seeing Nehru’s
functioning that Patel should have been India’s prime minister and Nehru the
president of India. Coming as it did from an inveterate opponent of Patel, it
was a revelation...A year earlier, Rajgopalachari had said the same thing...”
– Kuldip Nayar, Beyond
the Lines
~ ~ ~
“...[then] it
seemed to me that Jawaharlal should be the new President [of Congress in
1946—and hence PM] ...I acted according to my best judgement but the way things
have shaped since then has made me to realise that this was perhaps the
greatest blunder of my political life...My second mistake was that when I
decided not to stand myself, I did not support Sardar Patel.”
– Maulana Azad in his
autobiography, India Wins Freedom
~ ~ ~
“Undoubtedly it would have been better if Nehru had been
asked to be the Foreign Minister and Patel made the Prime Minister. I too fell
into the error of believing that Jawaharlal was the more enlightened person of
the two.”
– C Rajagopalachari (
Rajaji)
(who had then been pro-Nehru and anti-Patel)
saying two decades after the death of Patel.
(who had then been pro-Nehru and anti-Patel)
saying two decades after the death of Patel.
~ ~ ~
Kripalani had once commented: “When we are faced with thorny
problems, and Gandhi’s advice is not available, we consider Sardar Patel as our
leader.”
~ ~ ~
“You know, I never go to Nehru to seek advice or guidance. I
take a decision and just present it to him as a fait accompli. Nehru’s mind is
too complex to wrestle with the intricacies of a problem. Those who go to him
for advice rarely get a lead—and that only serves to delay matters...Nehru does
not understand economics, and is lead by the nose by ‘professors’ and ‘experts’
who pander to his whims and fancies...We should have absorbed Kashmir for good
and all...I do not know where we are going. The country needs a man like Patel.”
– Rafi Ahmed Kidwai
a close friend and a confidant of Nehru,
quoted in Durga Das’s India from Curzon to Nehru & After
a close friend and a confidant of Nehru,
quoted in Durga Das’s India from Curzon to Nehru & After
Nehru's Undemocratic Anointment
Sardar Ignored
Nehru is hailed as a person responsible for democracy in India, brazenly ignoring the fact that our democracy is thanks to our Constitution, which, in turn, is thanks to the Constituent Assembly (which comprised 299 worthies), its President, Dr Rajendra Prasad, and the Chairman of the (Constitution) Drafting Committee, Dr BR Ambedkar.
Nehru’s own election as the president of Congress in 1946,
that led to his becoming India's first prime minister upon independence, was
undemocratic.
In 1946, Azad’s successor as the Congress President was to be
chosen. The choice was critical then because whoever became the Congress
President would also have become the head of the Interim Government and the
first prime minister of independent India. This was the reason Azad had
also desired his own re-election.
Sardar Patel, Acharya Kripalani and Nehru
were in the race. 12 of the 19 PCCs (Pradesh Congress Committees) had sent in
the name of Sardar Patel for the post, and the remaining nominated Kripalani,
and additionally Rajendra Prasad. However, none recommended Nehru for the post!
As such, Nehru should have been totally out of the race, and Sardar Patel
should have been the clear, unambiguous choice.
Reportedly, Gandhi did tell Nehru that no one had nominated
him, expecting him to go by the majority; but, Nehru let it be understood that
he would not play second fiddle to anybody.
A disappointed Gandhi apparently gave
into Nehru's obduracy and prevailed upon Sardar Patel and Kripalani to step
down in favour of Nehru. This is how Nehru became the Congress President, and
thereafter the head of the Interim Government, and later the first PM.
If Nehru
were genuinely a democrat, he should have refused the position and prevailed
upon Gandhi to go by the wishes of the overwhelming majority.
Somebody asked Gandhi why he did so. Reportedly, Gandhi’s
reason was that while Nehru would not work under Sardar Patel, he knew that in the
national interest he could persuade Sardar Patel to work under Nehru. What
Gandhi said amounts to this: that Sardar Patel, even though senior and
more experienced, and backed by majority, was patriotic enough to work under
Nehru in the national interest, if so prodded by Gandhi; however, Nehru, junior, less
experienced, and not backed by a single PCC, wanted only to become PM, and was
not patriotic enough to work under Patel, in the national interest, even if
persuaded by Gandhi!
Dr Rajendra Prasad had stated: “Gandhi has once again
sacrificed his trusted lieutenant for the sake of the glamorous Nehru.”
1946
was not the first time Gandhi had ridden rough shod over Sardar to promote
Nehru. It was a case of déjà vu—there was a similar case in the thirties. On
account of differences between Nehru and Patel on the issue of socialism, the selection
of the Congress president for the next annual session had assumed critical
importance. Incidentally, Patel, Rajagopalachari and Rajendra Prasad were
opposed to socialism. If only they had led India
after Independence, rather than Nehru,
India would have been a
prosperous first-world country long ago. That time too Patel had a majority
backing, but Gandhi intervened to accord another term to Nehru, and persuaded
Patel to withdraw in his favour. That was yet another example of the great democrat Nehru getting
undemocratically elected—knowing very well what the wish of the majority was.
Integration of the Princely States
“...Whatever may be said about Mountbatten’s tactics or the
machinations of Patel, their achievement remains remarkable. Between them, and
in less than a year, it may be argued that these two men achieved a larger India,
more closely integrated, than had 90 years of British raj, 180 years of the
Mughal Empire, or 130 years of Asoka and the Maurya rulers.
“...He [Sardar Patel] was impervious to Mountbatten’s famous
charm, describing the new Viceroy as ‘a toy for Jawaharlalji to play with—while
we arrange the revolution’...
“...For Patel’s part, he realised immediately that
Mountbatten, with his own semi-royal status and personal friendship with many
of the princes, was uniquely suited to help India achieve its aim of leaving no
state behind.”
– Alex Von Tunzelmann,
Indian Summer
~ ~ ~
222 or about 40% of the 562 states, covering an area of about
22,000 square miles, were in just one region in Saurashtra in Gujarat
state—Kathiawar. Sardar Patel’s role in consolidating these 222 states was
described by Nehru as “a great step forward...one of the most notable in
contemporary Indian history...a far-sighted act of statesmanship...”
~ ~ ~
...Thus, with the withdrawal of paramountcy, the Princely
States were to become independent... 562 independent States! That would have
meant ominous prospects of civil wars, military takeovers, and total chaos—more
terrible than what happened during the partition! ...That may well have been
the objective of the British. Else, why could they not have so arranged that
the Princely States too had to either go to India or to Pakistan depending upon
their contiguity and other factors.
The Paramountcy could have been inherited
by the succeeding dominions. But, British wanted it to lapse, and create
difficulties for India. They wanted India to remain divided into as many parts
as possible. In fact, Sir Conrad Corfield, the pro-princes and anti-India head
of the powerful Political Department of British-India, had lobbied in London
and had left no stones unturned to ensure that the “lapse of paramountcy” was
incorporated in The Indian Independence Act 1947, so that the Princely States
had the third option—that of independence.
However, they had not factored in what Sardar Patel was capable of.
Says Leonard Mosley in The Last Days of
the British Raj: “Sir Conrad Corfield and other defenders of the
Princes were, however, being a little too optimistic. At the very moment that
they breathed the heady air of victory something came out of the blue and
floored them. The blow came from the
clasped hands of those two able political operators, Sardar Patel and VP Menon.
When the Congress Party had decided to form a States Ministry they picked Patel
as the obvious man to head it. Their mood was belligerent. They despised the
Princes and they resented the British for lapsing paramountcy. They hoped and
expected that the strong man of the Party would roll up his dhoti and wade in
with sound, fury, and effect. Patel was far too wily a negotiator to do such a
thing, particularly since he had the measure of Sir Conrad Corfield and admired
him as a skilled and dangerous adversary. This was, he decided, no time for
flailing fists and loud cries of screaming rage and fury. The blow must be subtle, unexpected, and must leave no unnecessary
bruises...”
~ ~ ~
Expansion of India’s geography by about 40% and consolidation
of its post-independence stability through the integration of the Princely
States demanded great foresight, sharp mind, deep wisdom, high-level diplomacy,
sagacity, boldness, guts, readiness to act and timely action—thankfully for
India, Sardar Patel answered to that rare combination of qualities and
requirements. Nehru just did not have it in him to accomplish all that; he
would have flinched from even attempting it; and had he taken the plunge, he
would have made a royal mess of it. Like Durga Das writes in India from Curzon to Nehru & After: “VP Menon gave me details of these
prolonged talks. Mountbatten was just flattering the old man[Gandhi], he said.
He is doing business with Sardar and has Nehru in his pocket. Sardar is playing
a deep game. He, in turn, is flattering Mountbatten and using him to net the
Princes...”
~ ~ ~
Apart from, "I
thought he [Nehru] wanted to make the
Maharaja [Hari Singh of J&K] lick
his boots..."; Mountbatten had made another observation: "I am glad to say that Nehru has not been put
in charge of the new [Princely]
States Department, which would have wrecked everything. Patel, who is
essentially a realist and very sensible, is going to take it over...Even better
news is that VP Menon is to be the Secretary."
~ ~ ~
Durga Das writes: “All
were agreed on one thing: While Gandhi was the architect of India’s
freedom, Sardar [Patel] was the architect of India’s unity.”
Junagadh
Writes C Dasgupta in ‘War and Diplomacy in Kashmir
1947-48’: “In an effort to head him [Sardar Patel] off from this course of
action [military action in Junagadh], Mountbatten suggested lodging a complaint
to the United Nations against Junagadh’s act of aggression...Patel observed that possession was
nine-tenths of the law and he would in no circumstances lower India’s position
by going to any court as a plaintiff. The Governor-General asked him
whether he was prepared to take the risk of an armed clash in Kathiawar leading
to war with Pakistan. The Deputy Prime Minister [Sardar Patel] was unmoved. He
said he was ready to take the risk...”
~ ~ ~
Writes V Shankar, private secretary of Sardar Patel, in
his book, My Reminiscences of Sardar
Patel Vol.1: “...But he [Sardar Patel] had to contend with two
important factors, one of them being Lord Mountbatten...Sardar had to be
particularly patient because very often Lord Mountbatten succeeded in enlisting
Pandit Nehru’s sympathies for his point of view...He was convinced that, in this
matter of national importance, police action could not be ruled out in the case
of Hyderabad and that the threat of its accession to Pakistan must be removed
at all costs. As regards Junagadh he was not prepared for any compromise and
finally succeeded in evolving and executing his own plans despite Lord
Mountbatten’s counsels against precipitating matters or his suggestion of a
plebiscite [under UN auspices] ...He
[Sardar] remarked with a twinkle in his eye, ‘Don’t you see we have two U.N.
experts—one the Prime Minister [Nehru] and the other Lord Mountbatten—and I
have to steer my way between them. However, I have my own idea of plebiscite.
You wait and see...’”
~ ~ ~
Sardar planned and executed the Junagadh operation so well
that the Nawab fled to Pakistan on 26 October 1947 leaving the state
to Shahnawaz Bhutto, who, facing collapse of the administration, invited India on
7 November 1947 to intervene and left for Pakistan on
8 November 1947. The Indian army moved in on 9 November 1947,
and Sardar Patel arrived to a grand reception on the Diwali day of
13 November 1947.
A plebiscite was held in Junagadh by India. It was conducted
not by the UN, but by an ICS officer, CB Nagarkar, on 20 February 1948, in
which 99%—all but 91 persons—voted to join India. Sardar was not gullible like
Nehru to allow himself to be made a fool of by letting Mountbatten have his
way, refer the matter to the UN—which Mountbatten had suggested for Junagadh
and Hyderabad too—and allow domestic matters to be internationalised, like that
of J&K, and be exploited by Pakistan and the UK.
Hyderabad
V Shankar writes in My
Reminiscences of Sardar Patel Vol.1: “Hyderabad occupied a special
position in the British scheme of things and therefore touched a special chord
in Lord Mountbatten...The ‘faithful ally’
concept still ruled the attitude of every British of importance...all the other
rulers were watching whether the Indian Government would concede to it a
position different from the other states...Lastly, on Hyderabad, Pandit Nehru
and some others in Delhi were prepared to take a special line; in this Mrs
Sarojini Naidu and Miss Padmaja Naidu, both of whom occupied a special position
in Pandit Nehru’s esteem, were not without influence...Apart from Lord
Mountbatten’s understandable sympathy for the Muslim position in Hyderabad, shared by Pandit Nehru, in anything that
concerned Pakistan
even indirectly, he was for compromise and conciliation to the maximum extent
possible...Sardar [Patel] was aware of
the influence which Lord Mountbatten exercised over both Pandit Nehru and
Gandhiji; often that influence was decisive...Sardar had made up his mind
that Hyderabad must fit into his policy regarding the Indian states...I know how deeply anguished he used to feel
at his helplessness in settling the problem with his accustomed swiftness...”
~ ~ ~
Very tactfully, Sardar Patel waited for Mountbatten to first
go from India
for ever, which he did on 21 June 1948—lest he should interfere in the matter.
Patel’s most formidable obstacle lay in Mountbatten and Nehru, who had been
converted by Mountbatten to his point of view—not to let Indian Army move into
Hyderabad. Had Gandhi been alive, perhaps Nehru-Gandhi combine would not have
allowed the action that Sardar took—Gandhi being a pacifist.
Sardar Patel had fixed the zero hour for the Army to move
into Hyderabad twice, and twice he had to postpone it under intense political
pressure from Nehru and Rajaji. They instead directed VP Menon and HM Patel to
draft suitable reply to Nizam on his appeal. While the reply to Nizam was being
readied, Sardar Patel summarily announced that the Army had already moved in,
and nothing could be done to halt it. This he did after taking the Defence
Minister, Baldev Singh, into confidence! Had Sardar Patel not showed such determination
and guts, and had he not ignored the tame alternative suggested by Nehru and
Rajaji, Hyderabad would have been another Kashmir or Pakistan!
~ ~ ~
In ‘My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel’ writes V Shankar:
“...the decision about the Police Action in Hyderabad in which case Sardar [Patel] described the dissent of
Rajaji and Pandit Nehru as “the wailing
of two widows as to how their departed husband [meaning Gandhiji] would have
reacted to the decision involving such a departure from non-violence.”
~ ~ ~
Meanwhile, a fanatical Muslim organisation,
Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, headed by one Kasim Razvi had been fomenting trouble.
They came to be known as the Razakars. At the instance of Kasim Razvi, Nizam
appointed Mir Laik Ali, a Hyderabadi businessman, who had also been a
representative of Pakistan
at the UN, president of his Executive Council. With this the Hyderabad
Government came virtually under Razvi. Razvi later met Sardar and Menon in
Delhi to tell that Hyderabad would never surrender its independence, and that
Hindus were happy under Nizam; but if India insisted on a plebiscite, it is the
sword which would decide the final result. Razvi further told Sardar Patel, “We
shall fight and die to the last men,” to
which Patel responded, “How can I stop you from committing suicide?”
~ ~ ~
On the use of force by India to settle the Hyderabad issue, V Shankar
writes in My Reminiscences of Sardar
Patel, Vol-1: “The entire staff for the purpose had been alerted and the
timing depended on how long it would take for Sardar to overcome the resistance
to this course by C Rajagopalachari, who succeeded Lord Mountbatten as
Governor General, and by Pandit Nehru, who found in C Rajagopalachari an
intellectual support for his non-violent policy towards Hyderabad..”
Shankar quotes
Sardar's response to a query, "Many
have asked me the question what is going to happen to Hyderabad. They forget
that when I spoke at Junagadh, I said openly that if Hyderabad did not behave
properly, it would have to go the way Junagadh did. The words still stand and I
stand by these words.”
Shankar further states in Vol-2: “The situation in
Hyderabad was progressing towards a climax. Under Sardar's constant pressure,
and despite the opposition of Pandit Nehru and Rajaji, the decision was taken
to march into Hyderabad and thereby
to put an end both to the suspended animation in which the State stood and the
atrocities on the local population which had become a matter of daily
occurrence.”
In a Cabinet meeting on 8 September 1948, while the
States Ministry under Sardar Patel pressed for occupation of Hyderabad to put
an end to the chaos there; Nehru strongly opposed the move and was highly
critical of the attitude of the States Ministry. However, Sardar Patel
prevailed.
~ ~ ~
Sardar Patel’s daughter’s “The Diary of Maniben Patel: 1936-50” states: “About Hyderabad, Bapu
[her father, Sardar Patel] said if his counselling had been accepted—the
problem would have been long solved...Bapu replied [to Rajaji], ‘...Our
viewpoint is different. I don’t want the future generation to curse me that
these people when they got an opportunity did not do it and kept this ulcer
[Hyderabad princely state] in the heart of India...It is States Ministry’s
[which was under Sardar Patel] function [to make Hyderabad state accede to
India]. How long are you and Panditji going to bypass the States Ministry and
carry on...Bapu told Rajaji that Jawaharlal continued his aberration for an
hour and a half in the Cabinet—that we should decide our attitude about
Hyderabad. The question will be raised in the UN...Bapu said, ‘I am very clear in my mind—if we have to
fight—Nizam is finished. We cannot keep this ulcer in the heart of the union.
His dynasty is finished.’ He (Jawaharlal) was very angry/hot on this point.”
~ ~ ~
Writes Kuldip Nayar in ‘Beyond the Lines’: “...Reports
circulating at the time said that even then Nehru was not in favour of marching
troops into Hyderabad lest the matter be taken up by the UN...It is true that Patel
chafed at the ‘do-nothing attitude of the Indian government’...”
* * * * *
Part-II and Part-III in subsequent blogs.
Rajnikant Puranik
Friday, October 31, 2014
91-22-2854 2170, 91-98205 35232
rkpuranik@gmail.com
www.rkpbooks.com
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