Blog-Series: Bewildering
Questions, Part-2 (Nehru)
A Bunch of Bewildering Questions
Part-II
Bewildering Questions (1) : Freedom,
Partition, Socialism, Dynacracy
Bewildering Questions (2) : Nehru's
"Exemplary" Score-Card
Bewildering Questions (3) : Indira Gandhi
Bewildering Questions (3) : Sanjay Gandhi
Nehru’s “Exemplary” Score-card
Question-17
Are these assessments justified: “Nehru was a great leader and
statesman…” Are they backed by facts and concrete achievements on the
ground? Should eulogy and flattery substitute fair assessment? What
about the following?
Most of the major
problems that India is still grappling with are Nehru’s legacy to
India:
(1)Nehruvian poverty-perpetuating, prosperity-preventing,
misery-multiplying socialism.
(2)Authoritarian, arrogant, callous, debilitating, heartless,
ill-mannered, indifferent, incompetent, inefficient, ineffective,
nepotistic, sloppy, sluggish, self-seeking and shamelessly corrupt
babudom.
(3)Millions in heart-rending pathetic poverty.
(4)J&K mess, continuing to bleed India heavily in terms of men,
money and materials since independence, and with no resolution in
foreseeable future.
(5)Unwise, intransigent, unprofessional, irresponsible, arrogant
external security policies of Nehru that failed to resolve the
India-China boundary dispute, which was eminently solvable in the
fifties.
(6)Indifference to the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils, with no steps
taken to nip the problem in the bud, leading Walter Crocker, who was
then the Australian ambassador to India, to comment in his book,
“Nehru: A Contemporary’s Estimate”, that while India and Nehru spoke
against the treatment of Africans in the European colonies, and
justifiably so; in contrast, with regard to the ill treatment of Tamils
in Ceylon, they did precious little: ‘...and with little done to save
Indians in Ceylon from treatment which was worse than the treatment
meted out to Africans in European colonies in Africa...’.
(7)Totally ignoring India’s own strategic interests, Nehru’s NO in 1955
to India's UNSC Membership, something which we have been desperately
seeking for decades, leading Shashi Tharoor to write in his book
‘Nehru: The Invention of India’: “Indian diplomats who have seen the
files swear that at about the same time Jawaharlal also declined a US
offer to take the permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council
then held, with scant credibility, by Taiwan, urging that it be offered
to Beijing instead...But it was one thing to fulminate against Great
Power machinations, another to run a national foreign policy with
little regard to the imperatives of power or the need of a country to
bargain from a position of strength…”.
(8)India-Pakistan Indus Water Treaty of 1960, which like the
India-China Panchsheel agreement of 1954, had generous “give away” but
no reciprocal “take”.
(9)Mishandling of Northeast; turning it into a
perennial problem.
(10)Leaving large areas ungoverned, or deficitly governed, or
ill-governed, or brutally governed, leading ultimately to large red
corridor.
(11)Politics of using minorities as vote-banks.
(12)Rather than firmly stamping out dalit and caste-based exploitation,
allowed Congress to play caste-politics for votes.
(13)Promoting one’s own, nepotism and dynastic politics.
(14)Messing up of the language issue.
(15)Distortion of Indian history.
(16)Mental and cultural slavery, and brown-sahib
culture.
(B)
Add to the above the following major blunders:
(1)Erasure of Tibet as a nation, thereby substituting an unfriendly and
dangerous China for a friendly neighbour and close cultural associate
of centuries, culminating in India-China boundary dispute.
(2)Panchsheel 1954, the worst ever international agreement, which
Acharya Kripalani termed as: “This great doctrine was born in sin,
because it was enunciated to put the seal of our approval upon the
destruction of an ancient nation which was associated with us
spiritually and culturally...It was a nation which wanted to live its
own life and it sought to have been allowed to live its own life...”.
(3)Ill-conceived, hare-brained, tactless and reckless Forward Policy,
which was actually a “bluff” masquerading as a military
strategy, that contributed to provoking the 1962 India-China War.
(4)Unbelievable and unpardonable neglect of military requirements
leading to India’s utter rout in 1962 India-China War, prompting S
Gopal, Nehru's official biographer, to write: “Things went so wrong
that had they not happened it would have been difficult to believe
them…”.
(5)Despite the “Glimpses of World History” and the “Discovery of
India”, Nehru failed to discover that India suffered slavery for over a
thousand years on account of its weakness to defend itself; yet, he
neglected modernisation of the army, strengthening of defence, and
pacts with powerful nations to ensure India’s security.
(6)Politicisation of the Army, well-captured by GS Bhargava in his book
‘The Battle of NEFA’: “...a new class of Army Officer who could collude
with politicians to land the country in straits in which it found
itself in September-October 1962. Since qualities of heart and head
ceased to be a passport to promotion for military officers...the more
ambitious among them started currying favour with the politicians…”.
(7)Advocating UN membership for China in all fora, and for the UNSC
permanent seat, not for India, but for China—China is now the beigest
opposer of India’s entry into the UNSC.
(8)Neglect of agriculture.
(9)Neglect of infrastructure.
(10)Gross under-industrialisation by severely limiting private sector.
(11)Neglect of primary education.
(12)Condoning of corruption.
(C)
Suppression of truth:
(1)Not ordering comprehensive enquiry into 1962 debacle.
(2)Pushing under the carpet report of even a limited
enquiry—Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat (HB) report on 1962 debacle.
(3)Doing everything possible to ensure the truth on Netaji Subhas’s
death doesn’t see the light of the day.
(4)So managing the media and the academia that by and large all remain
positive on Nehru, and those who dared to question were treated as
outcastes.
(D)
And, but for Sardar
Patel, what might have been unforgivable disasters
thanks to Nehru:
(1)Junagadh as part of Pakistan.
(2)Hyderabad as Pakistan-II.
The above
is only a partial list. It’s NOT an exhaustive list.
Question-18
“Nehru was the great moderniser of India…”
But, then what about the following?
Many countries, including those
in SE Asia, which were nowhere near India or were much behind India at
the time India got independence have marched far ahead of India. When
you look at their airports, their roads, their metros, their
city-buses, their well laid-out cities, their infra-structure, their
cleanliness, their everything, you wonder why you have remained a
country of crumbling roads, overcrowded locals, overhanging scary ugly
mess of mesh of electrical, TV and internet cables blotting the skyline
and brutally assaulting even the “chalta hai” sense of terribly
intolerable tolerance of the “have given up” generations; a country of
absent pavements or encroached pavements or pavements that stink from
the use they are not meant for, and where mercifully for the walkers
this is not so, they are but patches of broken down pavers, punctuated
by uncovered, or partially covered, or precariously or deceptively
covered man-holes, awaiting their catch; a nation of stinking slums and
impoverished villages, open drains and sewers, rotting garbage, squalor
and stink all around, children and men defecating by the road-side—all
testimony to criminal absence of the very basics of being civilised...
Most of the Indian towns, cities and metros are dirty, foul smelling
and hideous. They look like a defacement of spaces and a blot on the
landscape. Cities in the West, SE-Asia, China and elsewhere get better,
cleaner, smarter and spiffier year after year, while ours get worse,
more congested, more difficult to live in and more squalid.
How's it that we got so left behind? What is it that we did, or did not
do, after independence, that everything is so abysmal and pathetic? Why
an overwhelming majority in India is condemned to continue in abysmal
misery? What are the foundations of this misery?
And all this unmitigated misery despite the overwhelming advantage of
India as a nation with first-rate people, plentiful natural
resources, relatively better position in all fields—infrastructure,
trained manpower, bureaucracy, army—at the time of independence
compared to all other nations who have since overtaken us, grand
civilisational heritage, rich culture and languages, and unmatched
ethical and spiritual traditions.
Why did we fail to
leverage such rich assets of a gifted country?
Question-19
Wasn't Nehru an expert in international affairs? Didn't he
formulate India’s great foreign policy? Wasn't he the founder
of India's policy on external security and foreign affairs?
Was he not the last word on the subject? Could any one match up to him?
Foreign to Foreign Policy?
Jeopardised
External Security
Founder
of foreign policy Nehru was, but were the foundations solid? Or, were
they rickety?
Or, were there no foundations at all—was it all airy ad-hocism, and
one-man’s-pontifications? Crucially, was it a foreign policy that
benefited India? Or, was it merely a device for Nehru for
self-posturing and to project himself internationally?
How come all our
major neighbours became our enemies? And, a friendly neighbour, Tibet,
disappeared as an independent nation? How was it that our foreign
policy turned India into a country no one took seriously? You evaluate
a policy by its results, not by its verbosity and pompousness.
Nehru’s policy and strategy in J&K—part of the Foreign Policy,
in a way—actually gave birth to the Kashmir Problem. He failed to solve
the problem he had himself created, and actually made it more
complicated. He failed to mend fences with Pakistan.
Nehru allowed Tibet—that ensured India never had to worry about its
northern borders—to be erased as a nation. Nehru focussed on the Korean
conflict happening far away from India, while soft-peddling the Tibet
invasion next door, even though Tibet was so critical to our national
security interests.
It was highly hypocritical for a country like India
to shout against colonisation in world forums and preach on world peace
and security, and take active role in distant Korea, when it was not
bothered about its own peaceful neighbour, Tibet, getting colonised!
Other
countries, watching India’s foreign policy in practice, would
have been either laughing at its naivety, or sniggering at its
hypocrisy, or pitying it for not being alive to its own interests.
Wasn’t it ironic that
Nehru internationalised a matter he should not
have, while he refused to internationalise a matter that he should
have. He referred J&K—an internal, domestic matter—to the UN,
which he should not have internationalised; while he refused to refer
the Tibet-issue—a serious, external security matter—to the UN, which he
should have.
Nehru, thanks to his inexplicably adamant and unreasonable approach,
ended up creating and complicating India-China border problem and
allowed it to drift into an unfortunate war.
Through his inaction and indifference, Nehru allowed the Sri Lankan
Tamil problem to fester and grow. Its consequences have been terrible
both for the Tamils and the Sinhalas—and for India too: it has led to
bad blood with yet another neighbour, and allowed other countries to
fish in the troubled waters.
He could have and should have settled the India-China border issue and
the J&K issue—both his creations, in a way—and the Sri Lankan
Tamil problem during his life time, but he utterly failed to do so,
allowing the problems to become even more unsolvable and leaving severe
headaches for subsequent generations.
There is a right time for everything; and if matters are not tackled
when they ought to be, they get worse, and even turn into never-ending
nightmares. Like Brutus says in Julius Caesar: “There is a tide in the
affairs of men; which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
omitted, all the voyage of their life is bound in shallows and in
miseries...”
In the India-China War, when India’s condition was so pitiable, no
nation came forward to support. USSR supported China. The non-aligned
nations, you thought you were leaders of, did not support you. Only the
nation towards whom you had always been critical or abusive came to
your rescue—the US. Nehru and Krishna Menon used to unnecessarily rub
the US and other western nations the wrong way.
Nehru ended up having
no significant neighbour as a friend.
Nehru neglected the Southeast
Asian countries in our international relations.
Nehru
campaigned for China’s entry in the UN, and for making it a
member of the UN Security Council! And, let go our own chance of
becoming a member of the UN Security Council!! He thus jeopardised our
critical national security interests.
No country with a mature and prudent foreign policy wedded to its
self-interest would engage in a massive give-away like India did under
Panchsheel in 1954 without getting anything in return—like settling the
border-issue with China.
Success of a foreign policy and its by-products like finalisation of
borders and other issues are a function of a country’s economic and
military strength, alliances with other countries, well-formulated
foreign policies and wise diplomacy. It can’t be steered to success
merely on the gas of lofty pronunciations, verbosity, hubris,
holier-than-thou attitude and a single-man’s “pearls of wisdom”
pronounced from time to time in lieu of a well thought-out policy.
India was neither economically strong, nor militarily mighty, nor was
it part of any powerful alliance—it prided itself on being neutral and
non-aligned—nor did it have a well laid-out foreign policy. Yet it
flaunted its foreign policy and expected success through it. What could
be more infantile!! Nehru was in the habit of using that
term and the
term “childish” while snubbing those who opposed him either in the
parliament or outside—regarding himself to be the most mature and wise
person around. "Non-infantile" Nehru was not even willing to discuss
and
negotiate, and yet he expected success on India’s border-policy with
China!
Going by what India did or did not do during the Nehru years, it seems
there was a lack of culture of strategic thinking, and measures to
counter threats to both the internal and the external security were
largely neglected.
Fareed Zakaria writes in The
Post-American World: “Nehru
rooted India’s
foreign policy in abstract ideas rather than a strategic conception of
national interests. He disdained alliances, pacts, and treaties, seeing
them as part of the old rules of realpolitik, and was uninterested in
military matters...For much of Nehru’s tenure, his defence minister was
a close political confidant, V.K. Krishna Menon, who was even less
interested in military matters, much preferring long-winded ideological
combat in parliament to strategic planning…Indian foreign policy in its
early decades had an airy quality, full of rhetoric about peace and
goodwill…In many of his dealings, Nehru tended to put hope above
calculation. When he was warned that Communist China would probably
seek to annex Tibet, for example, he doubted it, arguing that it would
be foolish and impractical adventure. And even after Beijing did annex
Tibet in 1951, Nehru would not reassess the nature of Chinese interests
along India’s northern border…”
Not seldom did Nehru ignore the Cabinet and the Cabinet Committee on
Foreign Affairs when taking important foreign policy decisions. The
Cabinet, the Parliament, the media and the people at large should have
been kept aware of the facts of the northern borders right after
independence and should have been updated from time to time, but it was
not done. How could vital issues be hidden away from the public and the
Parliament in a democracy?
Indian foreign services were not well-staffed and there was no effort
to evolve a well-structured foreign policy by involving all
stakeholders. There was no coherent, well-formulated foreign policy
during Nehru’s time. Whatever he articulated in speeches or otherwise
became foreign policy. IFS and the External Affairs Establishment, true
to their babu-mentality, considered it safe to just follow him,
contributing little new, different or original. If Nehru ignored
certain areas or was indifferent to them, they too ignored them, even
if they were of vital importance, like Latin America, Africa and,
particularly, Southeast Asia, from which India had much to learn and
much to gain.
Nehru seemed
to be conducting foreign policy more for
asserting India as an independent nation, and for self-posturing, than
for the purpose it is supposed to serve—a country’s
economic and
security interests—giving overmuch time to issues that did not affect
India directly, like Korea, Suez-canal, and so on; unnecessarily
rubbing many important countries the wrong way; and ignoring or
inadequately dealing or improperly handling issues most critical to
India such as Tibet, Kashmir, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and India-China
Boundary Problem.
Ambedkar criticised Nehru’s foreign policy for trying to “solve the
problems of other countries and not [exerting] to solve the problems of
our own country!”
Nehru’s non-aligned policy fetched no gains for India, except allowing
Nehru to project himself. Without going against any nation or any group
of nations, India should have aligned itself with the West. Had it done
so, India would have gained in various ways. Economically, India would
have been far better off. Militarily, it would have been much stronger.
Britain and USA would not have favoured Pakistan over India on Kashmir;
and the Kashmir issue would have been solved in India’s favour long
ago. China would not have dared to attack India. So also Pakistan:
there would perhaps have been no Indo-Pak war.
Nehru made repeated mistakes despite enough sane counsels.
Incidentally, Nehru
himself had this to admit: “We were getting out of
touch with reality in the modern world and we were living in an
artificial atmosphere of our creation.”
Inexplicably Irresponsible Ideas
Reportedly, shortly after independence, General Lockhart, as the Army
chief (India and Pakistan had British Chiefs initially), took a
strategic defence plan for India to Nehru, seeking a Government
directive in the matter. Apparently, Lockhart returned shell-shocked at
Nehru’s response: “The
PM took one look at my paper and blew his top. ‘Rubbish!
Total rubbish! We don’t need a defence plan. Our policy is ahimsa
[non-violence]. We foresee no military threats. Scrap the army! The
police are good enough to meet our security needs’,
shouted Nehru.”
Question-20
Not seldom are those who tend to be critical of Nehru reminded by his
eulogizers: "It is thanks to Nehru India is a democracy, whose fruits
all Indians are enjoying—including you, who are freely criticising him.
But for Nehru, India would long since have been a fascist state, or
would have gone to dogs like Pakistan!"
Does the contention hold?
Elections were conducted in India
during the British times too. Congress had not only won the
1937-elections and formed ministries in many states; post
elections, with power in their hands, they had already become so
corrupt that Gandhi had desired disbanding of Congress after
independence. The last pre-independence elections were held in 1946.
Independent India inherited many democratic institutions, including
election machinery—only it needed a boost to handle universal suffrage.
It was, in fact, the Constitution of India framed under Dr Ambedkar,
and passed by the Constituent Assembly comprising scores of worthies
and headed by Dr Rajendra Prasad, which had provided for universal
adult franchise and democratic setup. So, how can the credit be given
to Nehru? True, elections were held in 1952 and it was a massive
affair, with universal adult franchise, the main credit for which goes
to Sukumar Sen, India's first Chief Election Commissioner.
Nehru's Own Undemocratic Anointment
Nehru’s own election as the president of Congress in 1946, that led to
his becoming India's first prime minister upon independence, was
undemocratic. In 1946, Azad’s successor as the Congress President was
to be chosen. The choice was critical then because whoever became the
Congress President would also have become the head of the Interim
Government and the first prime minister of independent India.
12 of the 15 (80%) PCCs nominated Sardar Patel. 3 PCCs of the 15 (20%)
did not nominate anyone. Although Mahatma Gandhi had made his choice
clear in favour of Nehru, and it was known to Congress persons and
PCCs, yet not a single PCC nominated Nehru. As such, Nehru should have
been totally out of the race. It was a non-contest. Sardar
Patel was the only choice, and an undisputed choice, with not a single
opposition. But, was Sardar Patel chosen?
Reportedly, Gandhi did tell Nehru that no one had nominated him,
expecting him to go by the majority; but, Nehru let it be understood
that he would not play second fiddle to anybody. A disappointed Gandhi
apparently gave into Nehru's obduracy and prevailed upon Sardar
Patel to step down in favour of Nehru. This is how Nehru
became the Congress President, and thereafter the head of the Interim
Government, and later the first PM. If Nehru were genuinely a democrat,
he should have refused the position and prevailed upon Gandhi to go by
the wishes of the overwhelming majority.
Dr Rajendra Prasad had stated: “Gandhi has once again sacrificed his
trusted lieutenant for the sake of the glamorous Nehru.” 1946 was not
the first time Gandhi had ridden rough shod over Sardar to promote
Nehru. It was a case of déjà vu—there was a similar case in the
thirties. On account of differences between Nehru and Patel on the
issue of socialism, the selection of the Congress president for the
next annual session had assumed critical importance. Incidentally,
Patel, Rajagopalachari and Rajendra Prasad were opposed to socialism.
If only they had led India after Independence, rather than Nehru, India
would have been a prosperous first-world country long ago. That time
too Patel had a majority backing, but Gandhi intervened to accord
another term to Nehru, and persuaded Patel to withdraw in his favour.
That was yet another example of the "great democrat"
Nehru getting undemocratically elected—knowing very well what the wish
of the majority was.
Writes Maulana Azad in his autobiography, India Wins Freedom:
“...[then] it seemed to
me that Jawaharlal should be the new President [of Congress in 1946—and
hence PM] ...I acted according to my best judgement but the way things
have shaped since then has made me to realise that this was perhaps the
greatest blunder of my political life...My second mistake was that when
I decided not to stand myself, I did not support Sardar Patel.”
This is what Rajaji, who had then been pro-Nehru and anti-Patel, had to
say two decades after the death of Patel: “Undoubtedly it would have been
better if Nehru had been asked to be the Foreign Minister and Patel
made the Prime Minister. I too fell into the error of believing that
Jawaharlal was the more enlightened person of the two.” It
is another matter that Nehru greatly blundered on the foreign policy
too.
Not Democracy, But Dynasty First
Dynastic politics was not started by Jawaharlal, he only carried it
forward. It was actually started by his father—Motilal. When Motilal
Nehru retired as the Congress president in 1929, he made sure, with
Gandhiji’s backing, that his son, Jawaharlal, ascended the gaddi, over
the heads of people much more senior and capable than him.
Earlier, in order to neutralise Motilal Nehru’s dissent from the
Gandhian approach to freedom struggle, Gandhi shrewdly picked up
Jawaharlal Nehru in 1924 to be his principal aide as General Secretary
of the Congress, thereby unjustly ignoring many senior and more
competent congressmen.
Jawaharlal Nehru’s dynastic tendencies were apparent in the 1930s.
After the 1937 elections when the ministry was being formed in UP, Rafi
Ahmed Kidwai and Govind Ballabh Pant, who became the Chief Minister,
proposed to Nehru inclusion of Mrs Vijaylakshmi Pandit [Nehru’s sister]
in the ministry, which he readily agreed. Why did they do it? Not
because they considered Vijaylakshmi competent! But, by doing
so, they hoped to receive Nehru’s favour, and hoped to save themselves
from unnecessary interference and outbursts of Nehru!
On Vijaylakshmi Pandit, there is an episode of the time Nehru was head
of the Interim Government in 1946, as written by Stanley Wolpert in his
book, Nehru: A Tryst
with Destiny, “Liaquat
Ali Khan and Nehru almost came to blows in the interim government’s
cabinet, when Nehru named his sister Nan [Vijaylakshmi Pandit] as
India’s first ambassador to Moscow. Liaquat was livid at such
autocratic blatant nepotism, but his protests fell on deaf ears. Nehru
yelled louder and threatened to resign immediately if Dickie
[Mountbatten] supported Liaquat in the matter.”
Writes S. Nijalingappa in My
Life and Politics: “Another
such instance I remember was when Dr. S. Radhakrishnan was president of
India...I used to call on him whenever I was in Delhi...In his talks
with me, as I believe with others too, he was very frank and open. One
day, when I went to him he said, ‘Nijalingappa, today I put my foot
down. Do you know why?’ He then continued, ‘Pandit Nehru comes to me
and wants me to make his sister, Vijay Lakshmi Pandit, vice-president
of India. I had to tell him, “You are the prime minister of India, your
daughter is the president of Indian National Congress and you want your
sister to be vice-president. What would people say? I cannot have it.”
I put my foot down and sent him away.’
“I think Nehru had
promised his sister the post and when she could not get it, she was
very angry with her brother. She complained to me about it when she
came to my house for breakfast, and said that her brother did not keep
his promise. I did not tell her what Dr S. Radhakrishnan had told me.”
[
Incidentally, this is what a piece by GS Ujjanappa states in The Time of India
of 12 June 2013 about Nijalingappa: “The grand old man of Chitradurga
[Nijalingappa] was known for his Gandhian ideology and had an
unblemished innings of more than six decades in politics. While most
ministers take months together to vacate their official residences and
continue to enjoy the benefits even after demitting office,
Nijalingappa was a class apart. The veteran Congressman politely
declined the offer of free government accommodation in Bangalore after
his wife passed away in 1989, and moved to his house in Chitradurga. He
had built the house in 1932 from his earnings as a practicing lawyer.”
]
Durga Das writes in his book that in 1957 in his weekly column in Hindustan Times he
wrote Nehru was building up his daughter for succession. He says he had
checked with Maulana Azad before writing the column, and Azad had said
he too had independently reached the same conclusion. Even Govind
Ballabh Pant had the same opinion. Later, when Nehru remonstrated with
Durga Das on the column, to mollify Nehru, Durga Das assured him that
what he had written would bring good publicity to Indira and would
stand her in good stead—at which Nehru felt happy and smiled.
Although Indira Gandhi had done little work for the Congress, she was
made a member of the Congress Working Committee—entry directly from the
top, rather than rising from the bottom. There were many seniors in the
Congress who felt unhappy and commented, “We are not dead yet.”
She was then made President of the Congress, to the astonishment of
all, after an intense behind the scenes drama, managed through others
by Nehru. Nehru had also started developing her as a public figure,
which included giving her exposure to foreign dignitaries and guests.
Kamraj Plan was also used to clear the way for Indira from the seniors.
Acharya Kripalani believed that the evils in the country emanated from
the top and that Nehru was the pace-setter in abusing patronage and
power.
Rajmohan Gandhi writes in Rajaji:
A Life, “Suddenly,
at this juncture, Indira Gandhi, Jawaharlal’s daughter, was named party
president. Her talents were yet a secret, and she had no experience of
party work. Several of Nehru’s colleagues were offended by the choice
but said nothing. C.R. [Rajagopalachari] was outraged.”
Writes Kuldip Nayar in Beyond
the Lines: “This
was where I first heard that Congress President V.N. Dhebar was
resigning and Indira Gandhi was taking over. Pant had supported Nehru
at Vinobha’s ashram but not at the CWC when Indira Gandhi was nominated
as the party president. He was careful not to oppose Nehru’s daughter
directly but argued that her frail health would come in the way of the
extensive travels the Congress president was required to undertake.
Raising his voice, Nehru told Pant that ‘she was healthier than both of
us’ and could put in longer hours of work. The subsequent discussions,
as I noted, were to fix the date on which she would assume charge. This
was the first time that dynastic politics came to the fore, and the
Congress since then has been following the practice of invariably
having a member of Nehru family at the helm of affairs...Left to Nehru,
he would have liked Indira to succeed him as prime minister, but too
many Congress leaders, with a long stint of sacrifice and struggle for
the country’s freedom, were still on the scene at the time.”
One may say that Nehru did not make Indira Gandhi the PM. But, he was
working towards it. However, before he could fulfil his mission he
passed away. Though he had done the ground work—given the necessary
visibility to her. Lal Bahadur Shastri had himself told that “in Panditji’s mind is his
daughter”.
Writes Kuldip Nayar in Beyond
the Lines: “I
ventured to ask Shastri one day: ‘Who do you think Nehru has in mind as
his successor?’ ‘Unke dil main to unki saputri hai [In his heart is his
daughter],’ said Shastri...Nijalingappa said he was pretty sure that
Nehru had his daughter in mind as his successor. In his diary, he wrote
on 15 July 1969 that Nehru ‘was always grooming her for the
prime-ministership obviously and patently’.”
Taken Shame Out of Dynacracy
Democracy grafted on a nation with a strong feudal mindset is likely to
degenerate into dynacracy, unless the leaders who matter consciously
devote themselves to ensuring it does not happen, both by setting an
example themselves and by putting in place appropriate systems. Nehrus
did the reverse. The dynastic politics that Nehru started and thus
sanctified, and what was even more shamelessly promoted by his
daughter, has now vitiated and poisoned our whole democratic system.
Following in the footsteps of Motilal, Jawaharlal and Indira, now most
leaders promote their own dynasty in politics. We are now already in
the era of blooming dynacracy! It has become all pervasive and has
vitiated and poisoned our democratic system. The whole democratic
process would soon get reduced to jockeying for power among select
dynasties!
Nehru: NOT Limiting the Term of the PM
If Nehru was a true democrat, he should have taken a page out of the US
Constitution, and limited the term of a prime minister to just two
terms—like the President of the US. Not only that, on completion of two
terms passing on the baton to one’s kin should also have been
prohibited, to ensure dynasties did not take over politics. Dynasties
have a vested interest in continuance at the expense of the nation.
They also have a vested interest in covering up all the wrong doings of
the dynasty.
Following Nehru’s footsteps, you find a strange spectacle of
people—whether young or old, and whether in a political position or a
bureaucratic position or a position in a sports body—not wanting to
ever quit. Where extension is not possible, bureaucrats would seek some
position or the other, post retirement. Officials of sports
bodies—whether a politician or a retired-IPS or a businessman or any
other—wish to continue for life!
The Example of the US in Sharp
Contrast to that of Nehru
Contrast the above with George
Washington, co-founder of the USA. He was
proclaimed the “Father of the Country” and was elected the first
president of USA in 1789 with virtually no opposition. Washington
retired in 1797, firmly declining to serve for more than eight
years—two terms—despite requests to continue. His tremendous role in
creating and running America notwithstanding, he didn’t harbour or
propagate self-serving notions of indispensability. The 22nd amendment
to the US constitution setting a maximum of only two terms for the
president came only in 1947. Prior to that it was only an observed good
practice for over a century.
Thomas Jefferson,
the 3rd President and
one of the founding fathers of the US, famous for his many achievements
and for having originally drafted the Declaration of Independence of
the US in 1776, was also requested, pressurised and persuaded
to consider continuing as President after completion of two terms in
1808, on account of his excellent performance on multiple counts—during
his tenure the geographical area of the USA almost doubled, upon
purchase of Louisiana from the French, which in turn ended the dispute
about the navigation of the Mississippi. However, stressing the
democratic and republican ideals, he refused, even though there was no
legal bar then, and people would have loved him to continue.
Irresponsible Act: Not Appointing
a Successor, Deliberately
Writes Perry Anderson, Professor of History and Sociology at UCLA: “For the rest of the union, the
lasting affliction of Nehru’s rule has been the dynastic system he left
it. He claimed to reject any dynastic principle, and his capacity for
self-deception was perhaps great enough for him to believe he was doing
so. But his refusal to indicate any colleague as a successor, and
complaisance in the elevation of his daughter—with no qualifications
other than her birth for the post—to the presidency of Congress, where
Gandhi had once placed him for his own trampoline to power, speak for
themselves.”
He did not appoint a senior cabinet minister or a deputy prime minister
to function in his absence when he went abroad. A responsible prime
minister would have done so, and would have scotched all speculations
on “After Nehru, who?”
But he deliberately did not do so both to show to the world how
indispensable and irreplaceable he was, and to make way for his
daughter. Nehru thus
sacrificed national interests for personal dynastic interests.
Wrote Walter Crocker, who was then the Australian ambassador to India,
in his book, Nehru: A
Contemporary’s Estimate: “It is no less strange that Nehru
clung to office for so long. It would have been of help to the cause of
parliamentary democracy in India if he had stood down...This is what
Kemal Ataturk did...For one thing his long domination sapped the
opposition; the opposition is an essential part of parliamentary
democracy...”
Nehru's mentor, Gandhi, took care to appoint him as PM, and never
promoted his own progeny. Nehru, despite having ruled too long, did not
think it fit to pass the baton to anyone, even though it was not as if
the country was doing great during his time, and his not being there
would have adversely affected the nation. On the contrary, with him not
there, things might have improved, provided, of course, the baton had
not been passed to his daughter!
Contrast Nehru with Sardar Patel, who had told his son and grandson,
when they visited him [Sardar] after he suffered a heart-attack in
Delhi: “As long as I am in this chair, don’t visit Delhi, unless I am
unwell and you have to see me...All sorts of people will contact you.
Take care.” (Rajmohan Gandhi in Patel–A
Life, Page# 473.)
Question-21
Dreamer & an Idealist?
Unable to rebut Nehru’s faulty handling of many issues like Kashmir,
India-China war, economy and so on, his admirers have invented an
innovative alibi:
Nehru
was a dreamer and an idealist!
"Dreamer" implying he had great vision, and "idealist" implying that he
was a man of high principles, lofty moral standards, and impeccably
cultured and hence, thanks to the machinations of his unprincipled
adversaries, he lost out on certain counts.
But, was it so?
Dreamer?
One would have highly appreciated Nehru as a dreamer if he had helped
millions realise their dreams that they had upon independence. Sadly,
thanks to Nehruvian economics, the fond dreams of millions turned into
nightmares! Was dreaming of a political leader at the top-most
responsible position an elitist luxury and an indulgence afforded by
the exclusive environs of Lutyen's Delhi?
Idealist? High Principles?
Talking of "idealism" and "high principles", may one ask what were
those high principles that prevented Nehru from finding a negotiated
settlement of Indo-China borders?
What was that lofty ideal that
allowed Nehru to mutely accept erasure of our peaceful neighbour,
Tibet, as a nation?
What were those principled compulsions
that drove Nehru to refuse Tibet’s repeated pleading to raise its issue
in the UN?
What were those high moral standards that forbade
Nehru to ensure Sri Lanka treated its Tamil citizens fairly?
What were those high principles that allowed nepotistic promotion by
him of his daughter?
Where was the great morality in protecting the corrupt—which he tried
for some of his colleagues?
Was it conscionable (or
a matter of high principles!) for him to continue as
a prime minister after the debacle in the India-China war?
Wrote JP Dalvi in his book Himalayan
Blunder:
“When
the inevitable disaster came Nehru did not even have grace or
courage to admit his errors or seek a fresh mandate from the people. He
did not even go through the motion of resigning; he merely presented
his trusted colleagues and military appointees as sacrificial
offerings... Instead of gracefully accepting responsibility
for
erroneous policies, the guilty men sought alibis and scapegoats. In any
developed democracy the Government would have been replaced, instead of
being allowed to continue in office and sit in judgement on their
subordinates..."
Here
is Israel/Golda
Mier's example in sharp contrast to that of India/Nehru's:
Israel successfully repelled the combined attack from Egypt and Syria
in 1973—what has come to be known as the Yom Kipper War. After its
decisive victories against the Arabs in 1967, Israel was a little laid
back and unprepared, thinking there wouldn’t be any further wars. The
attack of 1973 therefore came as a surprise to it. Still, after the
initial setbacks and panic, it rose to the challenge. Golda Meir was
the president then. Even though Israel’s ultimate victory was
spectacular and decisive, they immediately instituted an enquiry to fix
responsibility for the initial setbacks and the panic reaction, and the
lapses that led to the attack coming as a surprise. The preliminary
report took just a few months and was released on April 2, 1974—it
actually named names of those responsible. Several top-ranking staff
were asked to resign. Golda Meir
was not named, but taking overall
responsibility, she resigned on April 10, 1974—after mere eight days of
release of the report, which was only a preliminary report! This, even
though Israel, under Golda Meir, had actually won the war decisively
and turned the tables on the Arab countries that had attacked them!
In
sharp contrast, even though India lost pathetically in the 1962
India-China War, Nehru government instituted no enquiry; and Nehru did
not even make a gesture of an offer to resign.
Too nice and cultured?
Nehru was too nice and
impeccably
cultured and hence, thanks to the machinations of his unprincipled
adversaries, he lost out on certain counts. Really?
Just as a small illustration, if people studied how Nehru behaved with
Netaji Bose before his reported death, or with Sardar Patel
and Rajendra Prasad after independence, or in respect of all these
three leaders after their death, they would be shocked beyond belief at
Nehru's behaviour!
Even the current Modi's government is not declassifying files and
documents related to Netaji Subhas's death, on flimsy excuses, like
those of the Congress governments. The most likely real reason is that
it would totally expose Nehru, and in the process, other revered
leaders too!
Apart from dragging its feet in instituting an enquiry into Netaji’s
death, manipulating the enquiry report, being hostile to INA, and not
recognising Netaji for Bharat Ratna, Nehru’s Government had been so
hostile that in 1947 it refused to put up Netaji Subhas's
portrait
in the Parliament House. That's nice and cultured person
for you.
When Sardar died in Mumbai, Nehru, who himself attended the funeral,
advised the then President, Rajendra Prasad, to not attend the
funeral—the reason given by him was that as per the protocol, President
need not attend funerals of ministers! So he treated Sardar Patel as a
mere minister—what arrogance! A disgraceful attitude,
particularly when Sardar Patel had so selflessly supported
him in
the interest of the nation, even though Nehru had usurped the PM’s post
from him most undemocratically. Writes Stanley Wolpert in his book, Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny,
“Gandhi’s death reunited Nehru and Patel. Their reconciliation not only
saved Congress and India’s central government from collapse, but it
kept Nehru in power. Without the Sardar’s strength and support Nehru
might have broken down or been forced out of high office. Vallabhbhai
ran India’s administration for the next two years [before his death]
while Nehru indulged mostly in foreign affairs and high Himalayan
adventures.” That is what Sardar got for all he did for Nehru. But, of
course, Rajendra Prasad went. Sardar was not just the Deputy PM, but
was Rajendra Prasad's colleague of many, many years in the Independence
Struggle.
Another example is of Rajendra Prasad, about whom Gandhi had
himself said that his contribution to freedom struggle was second to
none. As per India from
Curzon to Nehru & After
by Durga Das, when Rajendra Prasad was ill and it was suspected that he
might not survive, Nehru was reported to have deputed Lal Bahadur
Shastri, his trusted lieutenant, to search a place of funeral as far
away as possible from that of Gandhi! However, Rajendra Prasad
survived. When he died, and his funeral was held in Patna, Nehru did
not attend, saying that he was busy with election campaign fund
collection in Gujarat! That time Nehru had advised Dr Radhakrishnan,
then President, “I do not see any reason for you to go.” Dr
Radhakrishnan had replied: “No, I think I must go and attend the
funeral. That respect is due to him and must be paid. I think you
should give up your tour and come with me.” But, Nehru stuck to his
programme. Nehru did not attend Ambedkar’s funeral either.
This is from the foreword of S Nijalingappa to the book, Inside Story of Sardar Patel—The
Diary of Maniben Patel: 1936-50:
“Strangely, however, while the collected works of many other leaders
[notably, Nehru and Gandhi] have been published by the government since
Independence, the collected or selected works of two foremost leaders,
namely Sardar Patel and Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose, were never taken
up by any official agency. It is for this reason that we constituted
the Sardar Patel Society, had it registered, collected funds and
published the Collected works of Sardar Patel in fifteen volumes...”
Nehru was also too vain, arrogant and full of hubris...
Nehru had visited the US in 1961. Writes Kuldip Nayar in Beyond the Lines:
“Kennedy organised a breakfast meeting between Nehru and top US
economists and foreign policy experts. Nehru was late for the meeting
and generally monosyllabic in his responses. The breakfast ended in 20
minutes. Some of them reported this to Kennedy who remarked in the
presence of his aides that Nehru had ‘lived too long’.”
Says Dalai Lama in his autobiography, Freedom in Exile:
“I [Dalai Lama] then explained [to Nehru] that I had not originally
intended to seek India’s hospitality [feeling let down by Nehru’s
attitude] but that I had wanted to establish my Government at Lhuntse
Dzong. Only the news from Lhasa had changed my mind. At this point he
[Nehru] became rather irritated. ‘The Indian Government could not have
recognised it even if you had,’ he said. I began to get the impression
that Nehru thought of me as a young person who needed to be scolded
from time to time. During other parts of the conversation he banged the
table. ‘How can this be?’ he asked indignantly once or twice. However,
I went on in spite of the growing evidence that he could be a bit of a
bully...”
There is an episode in Stanley Wolpert’s book, Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny,
which is as revealing as it is disturbing. While in England he wrote to
his father, Motilal, that his [Jawaharlal’s] chief reason for wishing
to go to Oxford was that “Cambridge
is becoming too full of Indians!” Such airs from the
grandson of the policeman, Gangadhar Nehru!
“Nehru was completely out of touch with the Indian life even of his
time, except with the life of the self-segregating Anglicised set of
upper India who lived in the so-called Civil Lines,” observed Nirad
Chaudhuri in his Autobiography
of an Unknown Indian, Part-II. Chaudhury says that Nehru
had little understanding of the actual India life or culture or of
Hinduism; and
was a
snob, contemptuous of those who spoke English with an Indian accent.
MJ Akbar in Nehru:The
Making of India
writes about an episode in the pre-independence period of a number of
poor villagers from the villages near Allahabad approaching him to
verify their actual extremely pathetic condition first-hand. Nehru was
not particularly enthusiastic about taking up the mission, particularly
in the hot summers. However, “He was touched when he learned that
hundreds of ill-clad villagers had built roads for him overnight so
that his car could take him to the innermost recesses of rural India;
and saw the eagerness with which they physically lifted his car when it
got stuck in the soft mud. After all, he was still an Indian sahib in a
hat and silk underwear.”
Question-22
Innovative Counterfactuals
Unable to eulogise Nehru on the basis of the actual facts, many
admirers, on the self-serving assumption that a person other than Nehru
would not have been able to do what Nehru did, resort to innovative
counterfactuals like: “
Had
it not been for Nehru India would not have remained united and secular.
But for Nehru, there would have been no democracy and the citizens
would not have enjoyed freedom...”
Does the counterfactual have any substance?
If facts don’t help you, go by presumptions and probabilities!
How about the following counter to the above counterfactual?
What if one
advanced an alternate counterfactual and argued that an alternate
person (like say Sardar Patel or C Rajagopalachari) as prime minister
would have made India more united, more secure, more secular and free
from communalism, more democratic and much much more prosperous, and
India would have been well on its way to becoming a first-world nation
by 1964!