Sardar Patel (I) : Interesting Extracts, Part-I
Sardar Patel (II) : Interesting Extracts, Part-II
Sardar Patel (III) : Interesting Extracts, Part-III
Sardar
Patel :
Interesting Extracts
Part-II
Part-II
Here are some select interesting extracts on Sardar Patel put
together
from the various chapters of the book,
“Foundations of Misery : Blunders of the Nehruvian Era”
Kashmir
A troubling question is that if Sardar Patel and VP Menon
could manage accession of 547 states, why could Nehru not manage smooth accession
of even one state he had taken charge of—J&K? [Out of 562 princely states,
the remaining had gone to Pakistan, being contiguous to it]
~ ~ ~
Nehru did not seem to realise that the support of the princes
and their collaboration would be indispensable in the coming months for
persuading them to accede to India.
To take on the Maharaja at that stage, and that too as Congress president, did
not appear to be politically wise. Sardar Patel and others tried to dissuade
him, yet he went. Sardar wrote to DP Mishra, “He [Nehru] has done many things recently which have caused us great
embarrassment. His actions in Kashmir…are acts of emotional insanity and it
puts tremendous strain on us to set the matters right.”
... ... ...
If Nehru had dealt with Hari Singh wisely looking to the
political options, had Nehru not allowed his personal bias to dominate, had
Nehru accommodated Maharaja suitably, had Nehru convinced him that his
interests would be suitably protected if he joined India, Hari Singh may not
have dithered and would have signed the Instrument
of Accession well before 15 August 1947; and J&K would never have been
an issue at all! There was nothing bad about being anti-feudal and hence
anti-Maharaja, only it was imprudent, given the situation. Nehru should have
tackled Hari Singh like Sardar Patel tackled the other 547 rajas and maharajas.
However, Nehru, rather than giving a sympathetic hearing to Maharaja, and
tackling him in a way that could lead to a favourable decision, appeared to be
vindictive.
Mountbatten was reported to have remarked about Nehru: "I thought he [Nehru] wanted to make the Maharaja lick his boots..."
States V Shankar in his book, My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel: “...Pandit Nehru regarded it as
axiomatic that only Sheikh Abdullah could deliver the goods and was prepared to
make any concessions to him to seek his support...Sardar did not trust Sheikh nor
did he share Pandit Nehru's assessment of his influence in the State. He felt
that our case in Jammu and Kashmir had to be met on the basis of the Maharaja
executing the Instrument of Accession, the thought of antagonising the one on
whose signature on that document alone we could justify our legal case in Jammu
and Kashmir was distressing to him...Sardar also felt it would be in
the long-term interests of India to utilise the Maharaja's undoubted influence
among the various sections of the people to force a permanent bond between the
State and India...He was doubtful if the weakening of the administrative
authority by the Maharaja to the extent demanded by the Sheikh was in the
interests of the State and India. He felt that the last thing that should occur
at that critical period was for the Maharaja and the Sheikh to work at
cross-purposes with each other or for the already disillusioned people of the
State to harbour doubts about the future of the Government or the Maharaja.”
~ ~ ~
September 1947. Maharaja
Hari Singh had reportedly decided in September 1947 to offer Kashmir's
accession to India. But it was refused by Nehru, who first wanted Sheikh
Abdullah to be freed and installed as the prime minister of the State—something
not acceptable to the Maharaja. Was it not queer? The nation being favoured
with accession laying down conditions, rather than the state agreeing to merge!
But, that was Nehru!!—‘Nehru/India J&K
Blunder-5’
States Sarila in The
Shadow of the Great Game: “Mountbatten added: ‘He [Patel] has also attacked Nehru for the first time saying “I regret
our leader has followed the lofty ideas into the skies and has no contact left
with earth or reality”’...This outburst probably reflected Patel’s
frustration with Nehru at the time, for refusing to accept the Maharaja of
Kashmir’s accession to India unless and until a government under Sheikh
Abdullah was installed.”
~ ~ ~
V Shankar writes in My
Reminiscences of Sardar Patel, Vol.1: “So long as Pakistan's armed
intervention persisted in Kashmir, Sardar was firm on settling the dispute on
the battle-field, rather than through parleys in the UN Security Council. In this matter he [Sardar Patel] found
himself completely opposed to the line of action and policies adumbrated by
Lord Mountbatten who was successful in persuading not only Pandit Nehru but
also Gandhiji to accept them. Mountbatten diverted the mind of Pandit Nehru
in two directions—conferences with Pakistan and a reference to the UN.
For the latter he secured Gandhiji's blessings...He [Sardar] was for utilising the opportunity to finalise the accession
without much ado or any further formalities.”
~ ~ ~
7 October 1947.
This is on the basis of the book, War and
Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48, by C Dasgupta. In the wake of Pakistani
activity, Maharaja Hari Singh had requested arms aid from India in early
October 1947, much before J&K’s accession to India on
26 October 1947. Sardar Patel had requested the then Defence Minister,
Baldev Singh, to do the needful urgently on 7 October 1947, who had,
in turn, instructed the Indian army chief General Lockhart. However, “the
decision that arms should be supplied to Kashmir on top-priority basis was
simply derailed by the Commander-in-Chief, General Lockhart, acting in
collusion with Field Marshal Auchinleck.” These British army officers, though
in the employment and pay of India, did what suited Pakistan’s and the British
interests!
(Sardar Patel had
ensured their subsequent removal.)
~ ~ ~
Looking to the precarious situation, Sardar Patel proposed
sending the Indian Army to J&K. However, Mountbatten insisted that unless
the Instrument of Accession was
signed by J&K in favour of India,
India should not send army
to Kashmir.
... ... ...
Notwithstanding the desperate situation, and knowing that
unless help was sent immediately, both the Muslims and the Pandits of Srinagar
would be butchered by the Pakistani raiders, and the Valley of Kashmir would be
lost to Pakistan, Mountbatten still insisted that unless the Instrument of Accession was signed by
J&K in favour of India, India should not send army to Kashmir. It seemed to
be a deliberate delaying technique on the part of Mountbatten to ensure Pakistani
possession of J&K by force, and a fait accompli for India—as the British
desired.
VP Menon flew to Jammu
the same day—Sunday, 26 October 1947—with the Instrument of Accession to have it signed by Hari Singh, which he
did.
... ... ...
Monday, 27 October 1947. The
Defence Committee meeting was held on 27 October 1947, presided by Mountbatten.
It was attended by Nehru, Patel, Sardar Baldev Singh and other ministers. VP
Menon, HM Patel and Sam Manekshaw were invitees. After the accession papers
were presented by Sardar Patel, Sam Manekshaw apprised the Committee of the
Military situation. Sam informed the Committee that the raiders were hardly seven
to nine kilometres from Srinagar; and unless the troops were flown in
immediately, Srinagar would be lost, because going by road would take days, and
once the raiders got to the airport and Srinagar, it would not be possible to
fly-in the troops. He further informed that everything was ready at the
airport, and the troops could be immediately air-lifted, once the orders were
issued.
... ... ...
British were serving pro-Pakistani British interests. But,
Nehru? Why couldn’t Nehru recognise the British machinations and come to grips
with the unfolding crisis that required prompt action from India of airlifting
troops to Srinagar, failing which there was a definite possibility of India
losing Kashmir forever. What was critical was timely action, not dithering.
Sending troops later or leaving the matter to the UN would have meant allowing
Pakistan to occupy Kashmir by force, and Kashmir becoming part of Pakistan as a
fait accompli, which Pakistan wanted, and to which Britain was more than
willing to turn a blind eye. But for Sardar Patel, it is doubtful—because the
British didn’t want it and Nehru had hang-ups and was reluctant—if the prompt
action of airlifting troops to Srinagar would have been taken, as corroborated
by the following words of Sam Manekshaw.
Recounted Sam Manekshaw, who later became the first Field Marshal in the Indian
army, in his interview
with Prem Shankar Jha, available on the internet at many websites: “At the
morning meeting he [VP Menon/Patel] handed over the (Accession) thing.
Mountbatten turned around and said, ‘come on Manekji (He called me Manekji instead of Manekshaw), what is the military
situation?’ I gave him the military situation, and told him that unless we flew
in troops immediately, we would have lost Srinagar, because going by road would
take days, and once the tribesmen got to the airport and Srinagar, we couldn't
fly troops in. Everything was ready at the airport. As usual Nehru talked about the United Nations, Russia, Africa, God
almighty, everybody, until Sardar Patel lost his temper. He said, ‘Jawaharlal,
do you want Kashmir, or do you want to give it away.’ He (Nehru) said, ‘Of
course, I want Kashmir.’ Then he (Patel) said ‘Please give your
orders.’ And before he could say anything Sardar Patel turned to me and said,
‘You have got your orders.’ I walked out, and we started flying in troops...”
~ ~ ~
Tuesday, 28 October 1947, 8.30pm.
Writes V Shankar in My Reminiscences
of Sardar Patel, Volume 1: “Lord Mountbatten persuaded Pandit Nehru to
make a broadcast in which he was to announce that the accession would be
subject to a plebiscite under the UN auspices. This was scheduled at 8.30pm on
28 October. Sardar used to insist on seeing the texts of important broadcasts
including those of the prime minister. Pandit Nehru had a very busy day and
could not send the text before 8.15pm. Sardar read it and noticed the
embarrassing commitment. He tried to contact Pandit Nehru but the latter had
left for the Broadcasting House. Sardar then commissioned me to go to the Broadcasting House and ask Pandit
Nehru to delete the offending phrase 'under UN auspices'..." However, by
the time Shankar reached the place, the deed was done. This was ‘Nehru/India J&K Blunder-8’.
It was imprudent on the part of Nehru to have made this
commitment of “plebiscite under UN auspices” at the instance of a British, Lord
Mountbatten, having his own axe to grind, without taking the patriotic Indians
who mattered—Sardar Patel and others—into confidence!
It seems that Nehru, the
claimed expert on international affairs, was innocent about the functioning
of the UNSC—UN Security Council. He was apparently under the impression that
UNSC functioned on the basis of the high ideals enshrined in the UN Charter and
looked to the merits of the cases referred to it. That the member-nations of
the UNSC acted in their own selfish national interests and engaged in
power-game was apparently not known to the foreign-affairs
expert Nehru.
~ ~ ~
2 November 1947. Reference to the UN
was something Sardar Patel, Dr Ambedkar and others were against, however, Nehru
again went ahead with it publicly in his radio broadcast on 2 November 1947.
Incidentally, plebiscite was held in Junagadh also, but it was conducted
by India itself on 20 February 1948, managed by an ICS officer, CB Nagarkar—as
arranged by Sardar Patel.
~ ~ ~
Writes Rajmohan Gandhi in his book Patel–A Life: “Patel was as strongly against the reference to the
UN and preferred ‘timely action’ on the ground, but Kashmir was Jawaharlal’s
baby by now and Vallabhbhai did not insist on his prescriptions when, at the
end of December, Nehru announced that he had decided to go to the UN.
Jawaharlal obtained Mahatma’s reluctant consent...Patel’s misgivings were amply
fulfilled after India invited the UN’s assistance...”
~ ~ ~
Contrast this [India’s readiness in India-China War] with
Sardar Patel’s action in Kashmir in 1947. Writes Rajmohan Gandhi in his book Patel–A Life: “In the judgement of
Sheikh Abdullah, scarcely an uncritical Patel fan, ‘events took a decisive
turn’ after Vallabhbhai’s Srinagar visit. ‘The Sardar did not lose even one
minute. He studied the situation and said that the enemy must be driven back.’
Major General Kulwant Singh and several hundred soldiers were flown to Srinagar
the next day. Taking over from Sen, Kulwant Singh freed Baramula on November
8... ‘In the last week of October 1947,’ Gadgil has recalled, Patel ‘took out a
map and pointing to the Jammu-Pathankot area said that the 65-mile road between
the two towns had to be made capable of carrying heavy army traffic within
eight months.’ He had seen at once that the battle would be long. When Gadgil,
the Minister for Works, pointed out that ‘rivers, rivulets, hills and
mountains’ were not so obvious on the map, Vallabhbhai said simply, ‘You have
to do it.’ Around 10,000 workers were brought from Rajasthan in special trains.
Floodlights enabled night work. Labour camps, dispensaries, mobile cinemas and
markets supported the drive. The 65 miles were completed on time.”
~ ~ ~
August 1949. BN Mullik,
who was the then Deputy Director of the IB—the Intelligence Bureau—with charge
of Kashmir, and later head of the IB, wrote in his book, My Years with Nehru, that Sardar Patel told him that he [Patel]
apprehended that Sheikh Abdullah would ultimately let down India and Nehru and
would come out in his real colours; and that probably things would not have
come to this pass at all if Sardar was still alive, because Abdullah had a very
wholesome respect and fear of Sardar.
~ ~ ~
(Regarding
Article-370)
Sardar confided to his
secretary, V Shankar, “Jawaharlal royega [Nehru will regret this].”
* * * * *
Part-III in the next blog.
Rajnikant Puranik
Thursday, December 18, 2014
91-22-2854 2170, 91-98205 35232
rkpuranik@gmail.com
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