Chapter-6 :
How India was Deprived of the Best First PM
Post 1945, with the
increasing hopes of the
imminence of India’s independence, all patriots looked forward to
having a
strong, assertive, competent, decisive, no-nonsense person as India’s
first
prime minister, who would bring back the lost glory of India, and turn
it into
a modern, prosperous nation. Iron Man Sardar Patel was the clear
choice, being
a cut much above the rest. And, nobody looked forward to having some
undemocratic, indecisive, clueless leader to mess up a hard-won freedom
after
centuries.
The Congress Party
had practically witnessed
Patel as a great executor, organizer and leader, with his feet on the
ground.
Sardar had demonstrated his prowess in the various movements and
assignments,
including that in the Nagpur Agitation of 1923; the Borsad Satyagraha
of 1923;
excellent management of the Ahmedabad Municipality during 1924-27;
tackling of
the Ahmedabad Floods of 1927; the Bardoli Satyagraha of 1928 that
earned him
the title of "Sardar"; the Dandi March and the Salt Satyagraha of
1930; successful management of elections for the Congress during
1934-37;
preparation, conduct and management of Haripura session of the Congress
in 1938
on a massive scale; building up of the party machine; role in
preparation for
the Quit India Movement; and premier leadership role 1945 onwards.
Patel’s
achievements were far in excess of Nehru’s, and all Congress persons
and the
country knew it.
Sardar was far better
academically, and much
more intelligent than Nehru. Like Nehru, Sardar Patel too had studied
in England.
But, while Nehru’s father financed all his education, Sardar financed
his own
education in England, through his own earnings! While Nehru could
manage to
scrape through in only a poor lower second-division in England, Sardar
Patel
topped in the first division!
Professionally too,
Sardar was a successful
lawyer, while Nehru was a failure. Sardar had a roaring practice, and
was the
highest paid lawyer in Ahmedabad, before he left it all on a call by
Gandhi;
while Nehru was dependent upon his father for his own upkeep, and that
of his
family.
Wrote Balraj
Krishna:
“Common talk among the
members of the Indian Civil Service
post-Independence used to be: ‘If the
dead body of the Sardar were stuffed and placed on a chair, he could
still
rule.’”{BK/xi}
Based on the
ground-level practical
experience since 1917, it could be said with certainty in 1946 that
Nehru was
no match for Sardar for the critical post of the prime minister. Of
course,
Nehru as PM in practice confirmed beyond a shred of doubt that it
should have
been Sardar, and not him, who should have been the first PM of India.
For
details, please read the author’s other books ‘Nehru’s 97 Major
Blunders’ and
‘Foundations of Misery: The Nehruvian Era 1947-64’, available on Amazon.
Critical
Importance of Congress Presidential Election in 1946
Traditionally,
elections for the president of the Indian National Congress (INC) used
to be
held yearly. With the end of the World War II, release of all leaders
from
jail, and hope of imminent freedom, it appeared likely that the
Congress would
soon be called upon to form the government. Hence, election of a
Congress
President, who would head the government as Prime Minister, became
incumbent.
Unlike all the previous occasions since the formation of the Congress
in 1885,
the election of the Congress President in 1946 became special and
critical—because whoever became the President would also have become
the first
Prime Minister of India.
Legal
Procedure
for the Election
As per the laid down
procedure in practice for many decades, only the Pradesh Congress
Committees
(PCCs) were the authorised bodies to elect a president. There were 15
such PCCs
They were supposed to send their nomination to the Congress Working
Committee
(CWC). The person who received maximum nominations was elected as
President.
There being 15 PCCs, at least 8 PCCs had to nominate a specific
individual for
him or her to gain the majority to become president. In 1946, the last
date of
nominations for the post of the president was 29 April 1946.
Result
of the
Election : Sardar Won Unopposed
The Congress Working
Committee (CWC) met on 29 April 1946 to consider the nominations sent
by the
PCCs. 12 of the 15 (80%) PCCs nominated Sardar Patel{RG/370};
and 3 PCCs out of the 15 (20%) did not nominate anyone. It therefore
turned out
to be a non-contest. Sardar Patel was the only choice, and an
undisputed
choice, with not a single opposition.
What was noteworthy
was that on 20 April 1946, that is, nine days before the last date of
nominations of 29 April 1946, Gandhi had indicated his preference for
Nehru.
Yet, not a single PCC nominated Nehru!
Hijacking
of the
Election by Gandhi–Nehru
Looking to the
unexpected (unexpected by Gandhi) development, Gandhi prodded Kriplani
to
convince a few CWC members to propose Nehru’s name for the party
president.
Kriplani promptly and unquestioningly complied: He got a few to propose
Nehru’s
name. Finding this queer development, Sardar Patel enquired with
Gandhi, and sought
his advice. Gandhi counselled him to withdraw his name. Patel complied
promptly, and didn’t raise any question. That cleared the way for
Nehru. The
“democratic” Nehru didn’t feel embarrassed at this blatant hijacking of
the
election.
Said
Kripalani later: “Sardar did not like my
intervention.”{RG/371}
Years later
Acharya Kripalani
had told Durga Das:
“All the P.C.C.s sent
in the name of Patel by a majority and one or two proposed the names of
Rajen
Babu in addition, but none that of Jawaharlal. I knew Gandhi wanted
Jawaharlal
to be President for a year, and I made a proposal myself [at Gandhi’s
prodding]
saying ‘some Delhi fellows want Jawaharlal’s name’. I circulated it to
the
members of the Working Committee to get their endorsement. I played
this mischief.
I am to blame. Patel never forgave me for that. He was a man of will
and
decision. You saw his face. It grew year by year in power and
determination…”{DD/229}
Gandhi-Nehru Act
: Why Improper?
Gandhi’s actions
must be judged in the background of his being a “Mahatma”, and an
“Apostle of
Truth and Non-Violence”. As Gandhi had himself stressed, “non-violence”
didn’t
have a narrow interpretation as just lack of violence, but a broad
interpretation where things like anger, illegal and unjust acts also
came
within the broad definition of violence. What Gandhi and Nehru
manoeuvred was
not only illegal, immoral and unethical,
but also against the interest of the nation. Here are the reasons for
the same:
(1) Illegality-1:
PCCs alone were authorised
to elect the president. There was nothing in the Congress constitution
to
permit that rule to be overturned. How could Gandhi overrule what 15
PCCs had
recommended? On what legal basis? Gandhi’s action was totally illegal.
(2) Illegality-2:
Gandhi had resigned from the
primary membership of the Congress back in 1934 to devote himself to
“constructive work” (Were political work and fighting for freedom
“destructive”?). Thereafter, he had never rejoined the Congress. How
could a
non-member of the Congress like Gandhi dictate who should be the
president of
the Congress, or even participate in CWC meetings?
(3) Unreasonable-1:
Did Gandhi put on record
his reasons for overruling the recommendations of the PCCs? No.
(4) Unreasonable-2:
Did Gandhi put on record
why Patel was not suitable as the president, and hence the first PM,
and why
Nehru was a better choice? No.
(5) Unreasonable-3:
Was there a proper,
detailed, and threadbare discussion in the CWC on why Patel was not
suited for
the post, and therefore why the recommendations of the PCCs should be
ignored?
No.
(6) Unreasonable-4:
If CWC was not convinced
of the recommendations of the PCCs, why didn’t it refer back the matter
to the
PCCs, and ask them to re-submit their recommendations, with detailed
reasoning?
The decision could have been postponed.
(7) Against
National Interest-1: How could
responsibility of such critical nature be assigned to a person without
doubly
ensuring that person’s relative suitability through fair and democratic
discussions among all CWC members, and, of course, finally through
voting.
(8) Against
National Interest-2: National
interests demanded that the choice of person was dictated not by
personal
biases, and diktats, but by suitability, and mutual consensus, and the
reasons
should have been put on record.
(9) Dictatorial
& Undemocratic-1: How
could an individual like Gandhi dictate who should or should not be the
president, and hence the first PM? And, if that was fine for the
Congress, then
why the sham of elections, and votes of the PCCs?
(10) Dictatorial
& Undemocratic-2: What
kind of freedom “fighters” we had in the Gandhian Congress that they
didn’t
even assert their freedom within the CWC, or show their guts against
the
slavery of Gandhi, and voice their opinions? Was an individual Gandhi
correct,
and were the 15 PCCs wrong?
(11) Unethical-1:
Leave apart the legal and
other aspects, was it ethical and moral and truthful for Gandhi to do
what he
did? If indeed he thought he was correct, and all others were wrong,
the least
that was expected from him was to explain his logic and reasoning. Or,
was he
above all that? Do what you want—no questions asked!
(12) Unethical-2:
How could a person being
nominated for president, and therefore as the first Indian PM, be so
devoid of
integrity, fair-play and ethics as to blatantly be a party to the illegality of
throwing the recommendations of the PCCs into a dustbin, and allowing oneself to be nominated?
(13) Unembarrassed:
Did it not embarrass
Nehru that he was usurping a position undemocratically through
blatantly unfair
means? Did it behove a future PM?
(14) Blunder:
Overall, it was a blot on the
working of the CWC, and on the CWC members, and particularly Gandhi and
Nehru,
that they could so brazenly and irresponsibly commit such a blunder,
which
ultimately cost the nation heavy.
Reaction
of
Stalwarts on the Improper Act
Wrote
Rajmohan Gandhi: “If Gandhi had his
reasons for wanting Jawaharlal, the party had its for wanting Patel,
whom it
saw, as Kripalani would afterwards say, as ‘a great executive,
organizer and
leader’, with his feet on the ground. The party was conscious too of
Sardar’s
successful Quit India exertions, not matched by Jawaharlal.”{RG/370}
Acharya Kriplani admitted:
“I sent a paper round proposing
the name of Jawaharlal… It was certain that if Jawaharlal’s name had
not been
proposed, the Sardar would have been elected as the President… The
Sardar did
not like my intervention. I have since wondered if, as the General
Secretary, I
should have been instrumental in proposing Jawaharlal’s name in
deference to
Gandhi’s wishes in the matter… But who can forecast the future? On such
seemingly trivial accidents depends the fate of men and even of
nations.”{Krip/248-9}
DP Mishra had
commented: “When we members of the Mahakoshal PCC preferred him [Patel]
to
Nehru as Congress President, we had no intention of depriving Nehru of
future
Premiership. The younger man had already been raised to the office of
Congress
President thrice, and we therefore thought it just and proper that
Patel, the
older man, should have at least a second chance [at Presidency, and
thus be the
first PM].”{RG/372} {DPM/185-6}
Dr Rajendra Prasad
had stated: “Gandhi has once again sacrificed his trusted lieutenant
for the
sake of the glamorous Nehru.”{RG/371}
In fact, without
Gandhi, Nehru would have been nowhere near the top. It was Gandhi who
sold him
and promoted him.
Wrote Maulana
Azad, who had always favoured Nehru over Patel, in his autobiography:
“...Taking all facts
into consideration, it seemed to me that Jawaharlal should be the new
President
[of Congress in 1946—and hence PM]. Accordingly, on 26 April 1946, I
issues a
statement proposing his name for Presidentship... [Then] I acted
according to
my best judgement but the way things have
shaped since then has made me to realise that this was perhaps the
greatest
blunder of my political life...”{Azad/162}
Maulana Azad
also confessed in his above autobiography:
“My second mistake was
that when I decided not to stand myself I did not support Sardar Patel.
We
differed on many issues but I am convinced that if he had succeeded me
as
Congress President he would have seen that the Cabinet Mission Plan was
successfully implemented. He would have never committed the mistake of
Jawaharlal which gave Mr. Jinnah an opportunity of sabotaging the
Plan. I
can never forgive myself when I think that if I had not committed these
mistakes, perhaps the history of the last ten years would have been
different.”{Azad/162}
Wrote Kuldip
Nayar: “[Humayun] Kabir [translator and editor of Maulana Azad's
autobiography]
believed that Azad had come to realize after seeing Nehru’s functioning
that
Patel should have been India’s prime minister and Nehru the president
of India.
Coming as it did from an inveterate opponent of Patel, it was a
revelation...A
year earlier, Rajagopalachari had said the same thing...”{KN}
This is what Rajaji,
who had then been pro-Nehru, had to say two decades after the death of
Patel in
Swarajya of 27.11.1971:
“When the independence
of India was coming close upon us and Gandhiji was the silent master of
our
affairs, he had come to the decision that Jawaharlal, who among all the
Congress leaders was the most familiar with foreign affairs [although
the
Nehruvian years proved Nehru had made a mess of the foreign policy and
external
security], should be the Prime Minister of India, although he knew
Vallabhbhai
would be the best administrator among them all… Undoubtedly
it would have been better… if Nehru had been asked to be
the Foreign Minister and Patel made the Prime Minister. I too fell
into the
error of believing that Jawaharlal was the more enlightened person of
the two...
A myth had grown about Patel that he would be harsh towards Muslims.
That was a
wrong notion but it was the prevailing prejudice.”{RG3/443}
Rajaji took over
from Mountbatten as the Governor-General (GG) of India on 21 June 1948.
When
Nehru had suggested Rajaji’s name as the GG, Rajaji had, in fact,
written to
Nehru that he (Nehru) should himself take over as the Governor-General
(GG),
and make Sardar Patel the Prime Minister. However, Nehru, vide his
letter of 21
May 1948 to Rajaji, had politely turned down the suggestion: “Please
forgive me
for the delay in answering your telegram No.26-S dated 12th
May 1948
in which you suggested that I [Nehru] might be GG [Governor General].
Any
suggestion from you is worthy of thought, but I am afraid the present
one is
completely impracticable from various points of view…”{JNSW/Vol-6/356}
Jayaprakash Narayan(JP)
stated in 1972:
“Rajaji once unburdened
his heart by publicly confessing to a wrong he had done to Sardar
Patel. I find
myself in a similar situation: the dominant feeling within me today is
one of
self-reproach, because during his lifetime, I was not merely a critic,
but an
opponent of the Great Sardar.”{BK/243}
The same JP, a
socialist, used to be in Nehru’s camp. After independence the
socialists had
been plotting to unseat Patel from his post as Home Minister. JP had
commented
: “A man of 74 [Sardar Patel] has the department of which even a man of
30
would find it difficult to bear the burden.” Mridula Sarabhai, who was
close to
Nehru, had launched a whisper campaign for Sardar’s resignation. It is
difficult to believe that the campaigns of both JP and Mridula did not
have the
blessings of Nehru, both being close to him.{Mak/129}
Wrote
Stanley Wolpert:
“The Sardar, as
Congress’s strongman was called, was determined to stay and solve
whatever
problems remained, rather than running away from them. He had long
viewed Nehru
as a weak sister and often wondered why Gandhi thought so highly of
him.”{Wolp2/377-8}
Wrote Minoo Masani
in his book ‘Against the Tide’: “My own understanding is that if Sardar
Patel
had been Prime Minister during that time and not Nehru, India would
have gone
further and faster.”{MiM/195}
Prof. Michael
Brecher of McGill University wrote in ‘Nehru: A Political Biography’, a
sympathetic, pro-Nehru book{MB/314-5}:
“…In accordance with
the time-honoured practice of rotating the Presidency, Patel was in
line for
the post. Fifteen years had elapsed since he presided over the Karachi
session
whereas Nehru had presided at Lucknow and Ferozpur in 1936 and 1937.
Moreover,
Patel was the overwhelming choice of the Provincial Congress
Committees…
Nehru’s ‘election’ was due to Gandhi’s intervention. Patel was
persuaded to
step down.
“One month after the
election the Viceroy invited Nehru, as Congress President, to form an
Interim
Government. If Gandhi had not intervened, Patel would have been the
first de
facto Premier of India, in 1946-7. Gandhi certainly knew of the
impending
creation of Interim Government. One must infer, therefore, that he
preferred
Nehru as the first Prime Minister of free India. The Sardar was ‘robbed
of the
prize’ and it rankled deeply. He was then seventy-one while Nehru was
fifty-six; in traditionalist Indian terms the elder statesman should
have been
the first primer and Patel knew that because of his advanced age
another
opportunity would probably not arise.
“There is striking
parallel with Congress election of 1929; on both occasions Gandhi threw
his
weight behind Nehru at the expense of Patel.”{MB/314-5}
Gandhi’s
Personal
Bias & Illogical Logic
Gandhi had
remarked:
"Jawaharlal cannot
be replaced today whilst the charge is being taken from the British.
He, a
Harrow boy, a Cambridge graduate, and a barrister, is wanted to carry
on the
negotiations with the Englishmen."{RG/370} {RG5/545}
But, what were the
facts? Who was more competent to negotiate with the British? Nehru or
Patel?
Subsequent history showed that the critical negotiations and
discussions with
the British, and the decisions that affected the nation, were
principally taken
by Patel, and not Nehru—Nehru being too timid, confused, and indecisive.
Gandhi had once
written of Nehru: “He [Nehru] is a friend of the English people.
Indeed, he is
more English than Indian in his thought and make-up. He is often more
at home
with Englishmen than with his own countrymen.” Gandhi had also
commented about
Nehru: “He is the only Englishman we
have!” Less said about this remark the better—Did Gandhi think
Englishmen were
the only competent people?
Another reasoning
attributed to Gandhi’s preference was that he felt Nehru was better
known
abroad and could help India play a role in the international affairs.{RG/370} But, if that were the reason, he could
have been made
foreign minister under Sardar. It is another matter that Nehru made a
mess of
the foreign policy, as obvious from the adverse results of his policies
post-independence. In fact, Sardar's views were far more realistic on
foreign
policy matters, and he would have done a much better job of it. (Please
see
details on the chapter on foreign policy.)
Somebody asked
Gandhi why he did so. Reportedly, Gandhi’s reason was he wanted both
Nehru and
Patel together to lead the nation, but while Nehru would not work under
Sardar
Patel, he knew that in the national interest he could persuade Sardar
Patel to
work under Nehru, as Sardar would not defy him.{ITV}
What
Gandhi said amounts to this: that Sardar Patel, even though senior
and
more experienced, and backed by majority, was patriotic enough to work
under
Nehru in the national interest, if so prodded by Gandhi; Nehru, junior,
less
experienced, and not backed by a single PCC, wanted only to become PM,
and was
not patriotic enough to work under Patel, in the national interest,
even if
persuaded by Gandhi!
“I asked Gandhi… He
[Gandhi] readily agreed that Patel would
have proved a better negotiator and organiser as Congress President,
but he
felt Nehru should head the Government. When I asked him how he
reconciled this
with his assessment of Patel’s qualities as a leader, he laughed and
said:
‘Jawaharlal is the only Englishman in my camp… Jawaharlal will not take
second
place. He is better known abroad than Sardar and will make India play a
role in
international affairs. [Why not make him Foreign Minister then?] Sardar
will
look after the country’s affairs. They will be like two oxen yoked to
the
government cart. One will need the other and both will pull together.’”{DD/230}
How
Nehru became Gandhi’s favourite
It is worth noting
that as long as Gandhi was alive Nehru pretended to be his faithful
follower
(and Gandhi reciprocated by calling him his son) for he was ambitious,
wise,
cunning and selfish enough to realise that the route to power lay
through
Gandhi’s blessings. Gandhi used to say that even though Nehru used to
fight
with him on many issues, ultimately he used to agree with him [Gandhi].
Little
did Gandhi know that it was not because Nehru agreed with him, but
because
Nehru knew that to continue to differ from Gandhi might cost him his
position—like it had happened with Netaji Subhas Bose—and his goal of
becoming
the prime minister.
Nehru’s socialism
was rather superficial—his posturing as a radical was a convenient ploy
to win
the hearts of the true radicals and the youth, even as he stuck to
conservative
Gandhi and Gandhism to advance his career. Gandhi had also said that
after he would
be no more, Nehru would speak his language. If Gandhi had watched from
heaven,
he would have known that Nehru had buried Gandhism along with his
[Gandhi’s]
death. Incidentally, this last thing was told by a Nehru loyalist, Rafi
Ahmed
Kidwai, himself, as quoted by Durga Das in his book
:
“
Jawaharlal has performed the last rites
not only of Gandhi but of Gandhism as well.”
{DD/279}
After Gandhi was no
more, Nehru practically put into
practice all such policies, norms, lifestyle and governance culture
that flew
in the face of Gandhism.
History of
Gandhi’s Personal Bias
Advice to Azad
Looking to the once-in-a-life-time prospect of
becoming
India’s first PM, Maulana Azad, who had been president till 1945, was
more than
willing to continue as President, and threw enough hints through the
media.
However, Mahatma Gandhi, who desired Nehru in that position,
remonstrated with
Azad, even writing a letter to him on 20 April 1946 to clear the air:
“Please
go through the enclosed [newspaper] cutting [stating Azad’s desire for
re-election]... I have not spoken to anyone of my opinion. When one or
two
Working Committee members asked me, I said that it would not be right
for the
same President to continue... If you are of the same opinion, it may be
proper
for you to issue a statement about the cutting and say that you have no
intention to become President again... In today’s circumstances I would
if
asked prefer Jawaharlal. I have many reasons for this. Why go into
them?”
{RG/370}
Personal Weakness for Nehru
The Old Man’s weakness for the Westernized
Nehru over the home-spun fellow Gujarati [Patel] was
yet another aspect of “Swadeshi”
Gandhi’s self-contradictory personality.
After the Gandhi-Irwin Pact of 1931, Gandhi had
mentioned
that the premiership of India would be “reserved for younger minds and
stouter
hearts”, hinting at Nehru. When Gandhi and Patel were together in
Yerwada Jail
in Pune in the early 1930s, Gandhi had queried Patel as to what
portfolio would
he prefer in the government of independent India, thereby throwing a
clear hint
that premiership to him was not on offer. Gandhi had also commented at
the end
of 1934 that he missed the association and advice of Jawaharlal [he was
in
jail] “who is bound to be the rightful helmsman of the organization in
the near
future.”
Acharya Kriplani had remarked that Gandhi’s reasons for
preferring
Jawaharlal “were personal rather than
political”{RG2/L-3142}.
Gandhi had called Jawaharlal his “spiritual son”.
How
Jawaharlal managed to become the “spiritual son” of Gandhi is a
mystery. Wrote
MN Roy in ‘The Men I Met’: “It can reasonably be doubted if Nehru could
have
become the hero of Indian Nationalism except as the spiritual son of
Gandhi… To
purchase popularity, Nehru had to suppress his own personality…”{Roy/11}
Nominating Heir
in a Democratic Setup
At the meeting of the AICC held in Wardha, Gandhi
formally
designated Jawaharlal Nehru as his heir on 15 January 1942. Declared
Gandhi: “...Somebody
suggested that Pandit Jawaharlal and I were estranged. This is
baseless. Jawaharlal
has been resisting me ever since he fell into my net. You cannot divide
water
by repeatedly striking it with a stick. It is just as difficult to
divide us. I
have always said that not Rajaji, nor Sardar Vallabhbhai, but
Jawaharlal will
be my successor. He says whatever is uppermost in his mind, but he
always does
what I want. When I am gone he will do what I am doing now. Then he
will speak
my language too... He fights with me because I am there. Whom will he
fight
when I am gone? And who will suffer his fighting? Ultimately, he will
have to
speak my language. Even if this does not happen, I would at least die
with this
faith...”{CWMG/Vol-81/432-33}
Rather odd for an organisation with supposedly
democratic
setup. Did Gandhi own the Congress that he could nominate his heir?
It was not the first time Gandhi had been unfair to
Patel—twice before he had unjustly promoted Nehru over Patel for the
post of
Congress president, first in 1929 and then in 1937.
Jawaharlal Nehru was given a leg up on Sardar Patel
in 1929,
his case being even more undeserving at the time. Sardar Patel had led
the
Bardoli Satyagraha of 1928 whose resounding success had made him a
national
hero, and had earned him the title Sardar.
The Bardoli Satyagraha was the first successful practical
implementation of the
Gandhian non-violent technique involving the rural masses on the
ground. Nehru
lacked such credentials. He didn’t have any significant practical
achievements
to his credit—he was more of a talker. Besides, Sardar Patel was much
senior to
Jawaharlal, and a larger number of PCCs had recommended him over
Jawaharlal.
Yet, Gandhi asked Patel to withdraw! Gandhi thereby tried to establish
an
unjust pecking order where Jawaharlal came before Patel.
Netaji Subhas Bose had subsequently written: “The
general
feeling in Congress circles was that the honour should go to Sardar
Vallabhbhai
Patel.”{RG5/322}
Jawaharlal’s father Motilal had a major role to
play in
Jawaharlal’s undeserved elevation. Motilal was the Congress President
in 1928.
He desired that his position should be taken up by his son. Subsequent
to
Patel’s Bardoli win, Motilal wrote to Gandhi on 11 July 1928: “I am quite clear that the hero of the hour
is Vallabhbhai, and the least we can do is to offer him the crown [make
him
President of the Congress]. Failing him,
I think that under all the circumstances Jawahar would be the best
choice.”{DD/128}
Motilal actively canvassed for Jawaharlal with
Gandhi, and
Gandhi ultimately succumbed to the pressure, saying Sardar Patel would
anyway
be with him. Nepotism and “fight” for freedom went together: Nehrus
from
Motilal downwards ensured their family was well taken care of; and that
it came
first, ahead of the nation! In the long run, the nation paid heavily
for
Motilal’s brazen nepotism, and Gandhi’s unwise step, and indefensible
indiscretion.
Wrote Durga Das:
“It was now clear that the Congress session at Lahore
[in 1929]
would be crucial. The provincial [Congress] committees [PCCs: the legal
bodies
to elect President] had recommended Gandhi and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
for the
presidentship of the Congress. Gandhi, who had resumed the party’s
active
leadership at the previous session, was expected to welcome the
nomination of
the hero of Bardoli [Sardar Patel], his most dependable lieutenant.
When Gandhi
announced his preference for Jawaharlal, the general body of
Congressmen,
especially the senior leaders who felt they had been superseded, were
astonished. For one thing, it was considered odd that a son should
succeed his
father [Motilal] to the Congress throne, and for another there was
regret that
Sardar Patel’s outstanding services had been overlooked. Having learnt
from
private inquiries that Gandhi had
succumbed to pressure from Motilal, I sought Gandhi’s version. The
Mahatma
pointed out that Motilal had repeated with greater emphasis the
argument put
forth in his letter of July 1928 that Jawaharlal represented youth and
dynamism… It is certain that Gandhi’s decision marked a turning point
in the
history of modern India…”{DD/134}
The presidentship of the Congress in 1929-30 was
particularly
important for several reasons. It was implied that the person who
became
president was likely to be Gandhi’s successor. He was also to declare
the goal
of the Congress as “purn swaraj” or “complete independence”.
S Nijalingappa writes in his autobiography:
“There is still another instance of the Nehrus
blatantly
supporting members of their own family. This happened in 1929. That
year Sardar
Patel’s name was in everybody’s mind for Congress presidentship as he
had
succeeded most gloriously in carrying out the No-Tax Campaign in
Bardoli. He
was the hero of the moment—of course, his whole life was heroic. As a
result of
that Satyagraha he became known as ‘Sardar’. But Jawaharlal Nehru’s
father
Motilal Nehru went to Gandhiji and insisted that his son Jawaharlal
Nehru was
young and very enthusiastic and it would be desirable that he be made
the
Congress president that year. Gandhiji acceded to Motilal’s request… I
am
mentioning the incident to show how the Nehrus helped their own.”{Nij/102}
Congress presidentship used to be for one year, and
rarely
was anyone given two terms. However, Jawaharlal was granted a second
consecutive term in 1930, thanks to Gandhi! And, Jawaharlal became
president
again in 1936 and 1937. In sharp contrast, Sardar Patel became Congress
President only once in 1931, even though his contribution to building
up the
Congress organisation was the highest.
Even in 1936, Gandhi had again favoured Nehru over
Sardar.
Wrote Durga Das: “The selection of the President [in the AICC of August
1936]
for the next annual session again assumed political significance in
view of the
differences between Nehru and Patel on the issue of socialism. Patel
and Nehru
had been proposed by Provincial Congress Committees; the former [Patel]
had a
majority backing. Gandhi, however, decided that Nehru be given another
term and
persuaded Patel to withdraw in his favour.”{DD/175}
What Gandhi did in 1946 should not have come as a
surprise to
Patel. The bias of Gandhi was clear since 1929. Sardar Patel should
have
factored in Gandhi’s unjust bias and favouritism, and devised his own
strategy.
Patel should not have given-in to
Gandhi’s undemocratic whims. Not because of personal ambition, but for
the sake
of the nation. Sardar knew well the weaknesses of Nehru, and his
unsuitability as the PM. He knew Nehru was capable of huge blunders, as
he had
amply demonstrated in practice. He knew that giving power and PM post
to Nehru
was putting the nation to grave risk.
Yet, he meekly caved-in. That was not Sardar-like. He should have
shown his iron then.
Was pleasing a senile, old, undemocratic Gandhi
more
important, or saving the nation, and taking it forward, more important?
Sardar
should have been ambitious and nationalistic enough to carry out his
historic
duty to the nation; rather than being an obedient chela of an
individual. That
certainly was Sardar’s mistake that proved very costly to the nation.
He should
have taken the risk and fought it out in the interest of the nation.
Sardar
should have been more loyal to the nation than to Gandhi.
Wrote Rajmohan Gandhi in ‘Patel: A Life’:
“C.R. [Rajaji] commented on his [Patel’s] attitude:
‘Gandhiji
has many blind followers who will not see anything with their own eyes
but only
with his. But Sardar is in a class by himself as a blind follower. His
eyes are
clear and bright. He can see everything but he deliberately allows his
eyes to
be blinkered and attempts to see only with Gandhiji’s eyes?’”{RG2/L-4222}
That Nehru was younger was certainly no reason. You
can’t
have young and blundering people rule the nation. Sardar should have
taken the
responsibility as the PM; and later, when unwell, should have passed it
on to
competent people like Rajaji or Dr Ambedkar.
Cost of NOT having
Sardar as PM:
For details, please read the author’s other book
“Nehru’s 97 Major Blunders” available on
Amazon and PustakMahal.com.
